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Abstract
This Comment explores the interplay between drug trafficking and extradition policy in the
U.S.-Latin American-Caribbean region by focusing upon the recent legal shift in Colombia and the
Dominican Republic. Part I describes the status of current international extradition law, focusing
on modern extradition policy. In particular, this part details the respective extradition treaties of
Colombia and the Dominican Republic with the United States. Part I also explores the roles that
these two nations assume trafficking drugs into the United States and highlights the corresponding
U.S. anti-drug enforcement response. Finally, Part I examines the challenges that drug traffick-
ing and certain anti-drug policies traditionally posed to developing extradition-friendly laws in
Colombia and the Dominican Republic. Part II inspects the new extradition reforms in Colombia
and the Dominican Republic and notes reactions to the new laws. Part III probes in closer detail
the motivations responsible for the shift in extradition policy in both Colombia and the Dominican
Republic. This Part argues that the form and content of the new laws, although influenced by U.S.
anti-drug enforcement policies, strongly reflect domestic power struggles occurring within Colom-
bia and the Dominican Republic. This Comment concludes that the motivations that shaped the
new extradition reforms will adversely impact the laws’ effectiveness in combating drug traffick-
ing.
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INTRODUCTION
Francisco Medina, known on the street as Freddie Krueger,1
participated in drug trafficking and racketeering and committed
over fourteen murders during the 1980s and 1990S.2 Medina op-
erated in a drug gang known as the Wild Cowboys.3 The gang
expanded its crack cocaine and heroin distribution ring in up-
per Manhattan, New York and the Bronx, New York by murder-
ing or assaulting its competitors.4 In addition to his affiliation
with the Wild Cowboys, Medina contracted his skills to a variety
of drug gangs.5 He provided expensive services, reportedly com-
manding US$10,000 per rival hit.6
Medina fled the United States in 1994.' He lived freely in
the Dominican Republic until 1997, when Dominican law en-
forcement officials captured and transferred him into U.S. cus-
tody.8 U.S. Marshals secured Medina on August 13, 1997, at
10:30 A.M. in Santo Domingo and immediately transported him
* J.D. Candidate, 2000, Fordham University School of Law. I thank my family for
their support and encouragement. I also acknowledge Prof. Abraham Abramovsky for
his guidance, Kent McKeever for assistance in obtaining Dominican documents, and
Terri Gerstein and Joseph Warmund for translation of Spanish-language texts. This
Comment is dedicated to my wife, Amanda.
1. A NIGHTMARE ON ELM STREET: FREDDIE'S REVENGE (New Line Cinema 1985).
Freddie Krueger refers to a character from the horror film series, "A Nightmare on Elm
Street." Id. Also known as "the bastard son of a thousand maniacs," Freddie exists in
the dreams of those children whose parents at one point burned him to death. Id. He
preys upon these children, mutilates them in their dreams with his signature metal-
clawed glove, and keeps their souls. Id.
2. See Christopher S. Wren, In 2 Extraditions, Drug Officials Sense a Shift in Dominican
Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1997, at Al (describing scope of illegal activity conducted by
Wild Cowboys); see also Shelly Emling, Dominican Criminals Escaping United States Justice,
ATL. JOUR. & CON., Apr. 13, 1997, at 7B (listing Wild Cowboy's death count at seven-
teen).
3. See Wren, supra note 2, at Al (describing Medina's role in Wild Cowboys as
"enforcer").
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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to New York, where he faced trial in the United States District
Court.9
Maximo J. Reyes led a Brooklyn, New York drug distribution
organization known as the Company in the early 1990s."° The
Company allegedly distributed hundreds of pounds of cocaine
on street corners, employing murder and violence to eliminate
competitors and to maintain internal order.1 One well-publi-
cized Company hit concerned a 1989 sniper shooting of an indi-
vidual lured into range by a fake 911-telephone call.12 In total,
the Company committed more than seven murders,13 and the
New York Police Department connected Reyes with four slayings
before he fled back to the Dominican Republic in 1993.14 In
1997, Reyes was caught and, together with Medina, he was extra-
dited back to the United States.' 5
The cases of Medina and Reyes expose a recent shift among
certain South American and Caribbean nations towards extradit-
ing their own nationals.' 6 These nations are strategically impor-
tant to both global and U.S. anti-drug efforts because of their
involvement in the production, manufacture, trafficking, and
distribution of illegal drugs. 17  Whereas the United States
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See Greg B. Smith, 2 Fugitives Likely Won't Face Death, DAILY NEWS, Aug. 15, 1997,
at 38 (reporting that Dominican officials conditioned extradition of Medina and Reyes
upon United States's promise not to seek death penalty).
15. Id. Reyes subsequently pleaded guilty to racketeering charges. The court sen-
tenced him to thirty years in prison. Peter Bowles, Cocaine Ring Leader Arraigned: Fugi-
tive Arrested in Santo Dominigo, NEWSDAY, Jan. 8, 1999, at A49.
16. Compare CONSTITUci6N POLITICA DE COLOMBIA tit. I, art. 35 (1991) ("Se
prohibe la extradici6n colombianos por nacimiente"), with ACTo LEGISLATrVO NUMERO
01 DE 1997 (diciembre 16,1997) (Colom.) ("Adems, la extradici6n de los colombianos
por nacimiento se concederi por delitos cometidos en el exterior, con siderados come
tales en le legislaci6n penal colombiana"); compare No. 489 LEY DE EXTRADiCI6N DEL 22
DE OCTUBRE DE 1969 (Dom. Rep.) ("La extradici6n de un dominicano no se conceder
por ningnn motivo"), with LEY 278-98 DEL 29 DE JULIO DE 1998, que modifica los Ar-
ticulos 4, 5, 8 y 17 y agrega los Articul6s 35 y 36 (Dom. Rep.) ("El Poder Ejecutivo es
competente para conceder la extradicci6n de un dominicano").
17. See R.I.R. Abeyratne, International Initiatives at Controlling the Illicit Transportation
of Narcotic Drugs by Air, 63J. AIR L. & CoM. 289 (1997) (listing statistical information
concerning role of different nations in drug production and trafficking). Colombia is
the world's leading supplier of cocaine base, while most of the base is imported from
Peru and Bolivia. Id. Private and commercial vessels in the Caribbean collect the con-
traband and transport it via commercial air and land routes to points along the South-
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strongly promotes anti-drug policies through its War on Drugs,18
the proliferation of illegal drugs in the U.S. black market19 is a
eastern coast of the United States. Id.; see Committee Hearing of the House Judiciary Subcom-
mittee on Crime: Hearing on Colombian Drug Cartels, Oct. 16, 1997, available in LEXIS,
Legis Library, Hearng File [hereinafter Hearings 1] (statement of Rep. Bill McCollum)
(explaining role of South American and Caribbean nations in international drug traf-
ficking). In 1997, U.S. officials expected Colombian 'cocaine trafficking to eclipse 600
metric tons. HearingI, supra (statement of Rep. McCollum). Caribbean nations such as
the Dominican Republic serve as transit points. Id. (testimony of Mr. "Rodriguez," for-
mer. Medellin drug trafficker).
18. See John T. Schuler & Arthur McBride, A Symposium on Drug Decriminalization:
Notes from the Front: A Dissident Law Enforcement Perspective on Drug Prohibition, 18 HOFSTRA
L. Rxv. 893 (1990) (describing history of term "War on Drugs"); see also Leslie Maitland,
President Gives Plan to Combat Drug Networks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1982, at Al (reporting
President Reagan's declaration of "war" on drugs prior to 1982 midterm Congressional
elections); Stephen Y. Otera, International Extradition & the Medellin Cocaine Cartel: Surgi-
cal Removal of Colombian Cocaine Traffickers for Trial in the United States, 13 Loy. L.A. INT'L
& COMP. L.J. 955, 955 (1991) (explaining that President George Bush treated drug
policy enforcement as if it were military campaign); Gregory H. Williams & Sara C.
Williams, America's Drug Policy: Who Are the Addicts?, 75 IowA L., REV. 1119, 1120 (1990)
(arguing that interdiction and eradication are ineffective anti-drug policies). The his-
torical U.S. approach to its domestic drug problem has been to attack external factors,
specifically through limiting the availability of drugs in society. Williams & Williams,
supra, at 1120. There are two principal strategies currently used to combat drug traf-
ficking: interdiction, the interception of drug shipments before they enter the United
States, and eradication, the destruction of coca plants in drug producing areas of South
America. Id.; see Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2291 (1994 & Supp. 1997) (author-
izing U.S. President to "certify" countries that cooperate with United States to end drug
trafficking). Additionally, countries are eligible for U.S. aid or assistance if they actively
support anti-narcotic efforts. 22 U.S.C. § 2291; see id. § 2492 (stating that if foreign
nation does not cooperate, President must suspend U.S. aid to that nation in form of
trade sanctions). Furthermore, the President must direct U.S. representatives in multi-
lateral development banks to vote against loans to the "deficient" or "decertified" na-
tion. Id. § 2492; see Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on the Western Hemi-
sphere, Peace Corps, Narcotics and Terrorism: Perspectives on Certification, Feb. 26, 1998, avail-
able in LEXIS, Legis Library, Hearng File [hereinafter Hearings II] (testimony of
Rensselaer W. Lee, III, Global Advisory Services) (describing role of decertification pol-
icy in anti-narcotics law enforcement). Many officials and commentators have sug-
gested revising the current certification policy. Hearings II, supra (testimony of Rensse-
laer W. Lee, Global Advisor). The changes range from "multilaterizing" the process to
include international review and the development of objective standards, to scrapping
the program altogether. Id.
19. See J.J. Juan R. Torruella, One Judge's Attempt at a Rational Discussion of the So-
Called War on Drugs, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. LJ. 1, 6 (1996) (arguing that high demand in
United States for narcotics fuels illegal drug trade). By Fall of 1996, there were almost
12 million illicit drug users in the United States. Id. Judge Torruella recounted the
following conversation with a Salvadorian attorney:
'Honorable Judge, we very much appreciate your presence and advice that you
have given us, but don't you think the United States could help us in solving
this problem?' I answered that as I understood the situation we were already
sending considerable sums in aid, and that we had a lot of resources commit-
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powerful economic incentive for drug cartels 2° to produce and
to distribute enormous quantities of drugs.2 1 Indeed, the pro-
duction or manufacture of drugs is vital to the economies of
many nations in the Latin American region.2 2 In response, the
United States has sought various means of obtaining wanted
ted to the interdiction of drugs from Latin America and the prosecution of
violators. He responded, 'Excuse me, your Honor, that is not the help we are
in need of. What we need is for your country to stop consuming these drugs.
If your people were not buying drugs, we would not be growing and selling
them. We would rather sell you coffee, or oranges, or bananas, if you would
only stop buying and consuming drugs.'
Id.; see Hearings I, supra note 17 (statement of Rep. McCollum) (describing pervasive-
ness of illegal drugs in U.S. society). As one U.S. Congressman noted,
In October 1997, the story in Washington, DC, Orlando, Florida, and almost
every city around the country is a sad one when it comes to drugs. Drugs are
more plentiful, pure, and cheaper than they were in the early 1990s. And this
has meant that far more of our children are becoming drug users.
Hearings I, supra (statement of Rep. McCollum).
20. See Hearing Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on the Western
Hemisphere, Peace Corps, Narcotics, and Terrorism: Drug Certification, Feb. 26, 1998, available
in LEXIS, Legis Library, Hearng File [hereinafter Hearings III] (testimony of Thomas A.
Constantine, Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") Administrator) (describing structure
of Colombian cartel operating in United States). Cartels are sophisticated and compre-
hensive crime syndicates that have been compared to mid-twentieth century Italian-
American, Irish-American, or Jewish-American criminal organizations. Id. As one offi-
cial has noted, however, "[w]hile organized crime in the United States during the
1950's through the 1970's affected certain aspects of American life, its influence pales
in comparison to the violence, corruption, and power that today's drug syndicates
wield." Id. Individuals possessing enormous power lead these syndicates. Id. They
micromanage all operational decisions, including shipping and storage arrangements,
how to properly package the cocaine, and who will be bribed and who will be mur-
dered. Id. They own airplanes, boats, vehicles, radar, communications equipment, and
weapons. Id.; see Hearings I, supra note 17 (testimony of Mr. "Rodriguez," former Medel-
lin drug trafficker) (detailing internal management structure of Medellin cartel). A
"cartel," as described by a former Medellin trafficker is "similar to a federation. It is
organized by autonomous groups. They unify their efforts and resources for common
targets." Hearings I, supra (testimony of Mr. "Rodriguez"). The Medellin cartel, for
example, had approximately 20 well-organized groups and other minor groups. Id.
The former drug trafficker explained that
the main purpose of this federation is to ship drugs .... Each member of the
group contributes [drugs] in order to lessen the risks and the costs. This get-
ting together is generally referred to as a 'pool.' Generally, the group that
makes up the pool is the group that has the connection with the contractor for
the transportation.
Id.
21. SeeJoseph B. Treaster, Colombia Fears for the Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1989,
at 5 (arguing that illegal drug trafficking supports Colombian economy). For instance,
one source suggests that the 1988 Colombian cocaine trade yielded US$4 billion. Id.
22. See id. (arguing that if illegal drug trade diminishes, then Colombian economy
will suffer deleterious economic effects). In 1990, U.S. officials estimated that US$1.5
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drug criminals, including extradition. 23  Nations that prohibit
the extradition of their nationals, however, hamper U.S. law en-
forcement efforts to combat its own domestic drug problem. 24
Colombia and the Dominican Republic occupy specific
roles in the international drug trade extending from Bogota to
Santo Domingo to Miami or New York.25 Both nations are major
actors in either narcotics production, smuggling, or street distri-
bution.2 6 U.S. efforts to curb drug trafficking through treaty
practice with these two nations, however, has historically met
with limited success.27 Indeed, both Colombia and the Domini-
billion of cocaine profits circulated within the Colombian economy, comprising almost
20% of the nation's total export earnings. Id.
23. See Mark Andrew Sherman, United States International Drug Control Policy, Extradi-
tion, and the Rule of Law in Colombia, 15 NovA L. Rv. 661, 663-64 (1991) (explaining
that U.S. employs irregular rendition techniques such as deportation, exclusion, and
abduction).
24. See Mark Fineman, In Court: Cocaine, Caribbean, Conspiracy; Drugs: Federal Case
Against Texas-Born Man Calls Dominican Republic Pivotal for Narcotics Trade, L.A. TIMEtS,
Oct. 22, 1997, at A10 (arguing that Dominican non-extradition policy frustrates U.S.
anti-drug law enforcement). But see Williams & Williams, supra note 18, at 1120 (argu-
ing that U.S. culture is responsible for its own drug problem). Other commentators
have observed that focusing on external factors such as foreign drug cartels, coca farm-
ers, money launderers, and even other governments prevents the United States from
recognizing that its drug problem actually stems from its own society's addictive tenden-
cies. Williams & Williams, supra, at 1120.
25. See Abeyratne, supra note 17, at 302-03 (reporting Colombian statistical role in
international drug trafficking). Colombia is the world's leading supplier of processed
cocaine. Id.; see Fineman, supra note 24, at A10 ("With a coastline of more than 1,000
miles, a 193-mile border with Haiti and its location in the Caribbean, the Dominican
Republic is a convenient staging area for the outward movement of drug shipments
from South America.").
26. See Hearings I, supra note 17 (statement of Rep. McCollum) (stating that Co-
lombia leads world in cocaine production, while Dominican Republic provides drop off
and transit points for shipping purposes); see Wren, supra note 2, at Al (stating that
Dominican drug gangs have overtaken drug distribution role in New York City).
27. See Smith, supra note 14, at 38 (describing denial of U.S. extradition requests
because of Dominican notions of sovereignty); Mark Fineman, Lone Superpower's Shadow
Darkens the Frustration of Caribbean Nations; Diplomacy: Island States Stand Firm Against
What Is Seen as Post-Soviet Bullying by Washington, L.A. TiMES, July 8, 1998, at A4 [hereinaf-
ter Fineman II] (describing Dominican refusal to capitulate to U.S. extradition de-
mands due to displeasure with U.S. foreign policy in Caribbean); Mark Fineman, World
Perspective; Dominican Republic; End to Extradition Ban to Put Criminals Within Law's Reach,
L.A. TIMES, July 24, 1998, at A5 [hereinafter Fineman III] (reporting that U.S. extradi-
tion requests directed at Dominican Republic have historically failed because of Domin-
ican fears concerning sovereignty); see also Luz E. Nagle, The Rule of Law or the Rule of
Fear: Some Thoughts on Colombian Extradition, 13 Loy. L.A. INT'L. & COMp. L.J. 851, 865
(1991) (describing Colombian denials of U.S. extradition requests out of fear of violent
response from drug cartels).
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can Republic statutorily prohibited the extradition of nation-
als.28 Yet, both nations recently repealed this policy and enacted
new laws that provide for the extradition of nationals.29
This Comment explores the interplay between drug traffick-
ing and extradition policy in the U.S.-Latin American-Caribbean
region by focusing upon the recent legal shift in Colombia and
the Dominican Republic. Part I describes the status of current
international extradition law, focusing on modern extradition
policy. In particular, this part details the respective extradition
treaties of Colombia and the Dominican Republic with the
United States. Part I also explores the roles that these two na-
tions assume trafficking drugs into the United States and high-
lights the corresponding U.S. anti-drug enforcement response.
Finally, Part I examines the challenges that drug trafficking and
certain anti-drug policies traditionally posed to developing extra-
dition-friendly laws in Colombia and the Dominican Republic.
Part II inspects the new extradition reforms in Colombia and the
Dominican Republic and notes reactions to the new laws. Part
III probes in closer detail the motivations responsible for the
shift in extradition policy in both Colombia and the Dominican
Republic. This Part argues that the form and content of the new
laws, although influenced by U.S. anti-drug enforcement poli-
cies, strongly reflect domestic power struggles occurring within
Colombia and the Dominican Republic. This Comment con-
cludes that the motivations that shaped the new extradition re-
forms will adversely impact the laws' effectiveness to combat
drug trafficking.
I. EXTRADITION, DRUG TRAFFICKING, AND
ASSOCIATED CHALLENGES
Extradition is an international law enforcement mechanism
28. See CONSTITUcI6N POLITICA DE COLOMBIA tit. I, art. 35 (1991) ("Se prohibe la
extradici6n colombianos por nacimiente"); see No. 489 LEY DE ExTRADIrC6N DEL 22 DE
OcrruBait DE 1969, art. 4 (1.969) ("La extradici6n de un dominicano no se concederi
por ningin motivo") (Dom. Rep.).
29. Acro LEGistATIVO NUMERO 01 DE 1997 (diciembre 16, 1997) (Colom.)
("Ademis, la extradici6n de los colombianos por nacimiento se concederi por delitos
cometidos en el exterior, con siderados come tales en la legislaci6n penal colombi-
ana"); LEY 278-98 DEL 29 DE JULIO DE 1998, que modifica los Articulos 4, 5,'8 y 17 y
agrega los Articulos 35 y 36 (Dom. Rep.) ("El Poder Ejecutivo es competente para con-
ceder la extradicci6n de un dominicano en los casos en que exista Convenio de Ex-
tradicci6n entre el Estado requeriente y el Estado Dominico").
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that can be utilized to realize anti-drug policy.3" Colombia, the
Dominican Republic, and the United States assume different
roles in the illegal drug trafficking trade.31 Numerous compet-
ing interests, however, have historically challenged the imple-
mentation of an extradition policy in Colombia and the Domini-
can Republic that contemplates the extradition of nationals.
3 2
A. International Extradition Law
Modem extradition law is based upon concepts that have
developed and evolved over centuries.3 3 As newer crimes arose
which extradition theory originally did not contemplate,3 4 na-
tions entered into treaties or conventions to develop procedures
for issuing or handling extradition requests and to enumerate
offenses that reflected these modern criminal trends.3 5 Colom-
30. See Otera, supra note 18, at 956 ("International extradition promises to be one
of the most powerful weapons the United States and Colombia have at their disposal to
battle with the Medellin cartel and cocaine trafficking."); Nagle, supra note 27, at 870
("Extradition has become the only effective instrument for Colombia to sanction narco-
traffickers."). But see Sherman, supra note 23, at 698-700 (arguing that extradition is
ineffective method to combat drugs).
31. See Abeyratne, supra note 17, at 302-03 (reporting Colombian and U.S. statisti-
cal role in international drug trafficking). Colombia is the world's leading supplier of
processed cocaine, while the United States is the world's leading consumer. Id.; see
Fineman, supra note 24, at A10 (explaining that Dominican Republic's location in Car-
ibbean is convenient for shipping illegal drugs); Hearings I, supra note 17, (statement of
Rep. McCollum); Hearings II, supra note 18, (testimony of Rensselaer W. Lee, Global
Advisor); Hearings III, supra note 20 (testimony of Thomas A. Constantine, DEA Admin-
istrator).
32. See Smith, supra note 14, at 38 (stating "the Dominican Republic has for years
rebuffed as intrusive U.S. efforts to extradite dozens of fugitives hiding in the Carib-
bean nation" who seek extradition of Dominican nationals). See generally Steven W.
Krohne, The United States and the World Need an International Criminal Court as an Ally in
the War Against Terrorism, 8 IND. INr'L & COMp. L. Rv. 159, 180-81 (1997) (describing
failure to extradite Colombian nationals due to "bitterness and resentment on the part
of the Colombian population toward the American government"); MitchellJ. Matorin,
Unchanging the Law: The Legality of Extraterritorial Abduction in Lieu of Extradition, 1992
DuKE L.J. 907 (describing general ineffectiveness of extradition treaties with countries
involved in narcotics trade); Sherman, supra note 23, at 698 (describing failure to extra-
dite Colombian nationals due to lack of rule of law in Colombia).
33. See Kai I. Rebane, Note, Extradition & Individual Rights: The Need for an Interna-
tional Criminal Court to Safeguard Individual Rights, 19 FoRnHAM INr'L. L.J. 1636, 1644-46
(1996) (stating that extradition developed over three thousand years); M. CHERIF BAs-
SIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL ExTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 1, 3 (1974) (explaining
that extradition originated in Middle Eastern and Asian cultures as symbol of respect).
34. See Rebane, supra note 33, at 1665 (commenting that drug trafficking and ter-
rorism created new challenges for international extradition law after World War II).
35. See id. (stating that international community attacked new criminal concerns
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bian and Dominican procedures for assessing incoming extradi-
tion requests are exemplified through their respective bilateral
treaties with the United States. 6
1. Historical Development of Extradition
Extradition is the surrender of a criminal or accused crimi-
nal by one sovereign to another.3 7 Extradition originally devel-
oped as a formal process to recover fugitives, as sovereign enti-
ties grew to respect the territorial integrity of other nations.38
Whereas the principle of reciprocity" is the fundamental mutual
concern underscoring an extradition relationship,4" the princi-
ple of extraterritoriality41 constitutes its basic limitation.42
The treaty system anchors modern extradition practice.43
through development of multilateral treaties addressing new crimes, as supplemented
by bilateral treaties).
36. Extradition Treaty with the Republic of Colombia, Sept. 14, 1979, U.S.-Colom.,
S. TREATY Doc. No.97-8 (entered into force Mar. 4, 1982) [hereinafter Columbian
Treaty]; Convention Between the United States and the Dominican Republic for the
Extradition of Criminals, June 19, 1909, U.S.-Dom. Rep., 36 Stat. 2468 [hereinafter Do-
minican Treaty].
37. BASSIOUNI, supra note 33, at 572; see CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY, TERRORISM,
DRUGS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND THE PROTECrION OF HUMAN LIBERTY: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, ITS NATURE, ROLE, AND IMPACT IN MATTERS OF TERROR-
ISM, DRUG TRAFFICKING, WAR, AND ExTRADITION 171 (1992) (defining extradition as "the
international judicial rendition of fugitives charged with an extraditable offense and
sought for trial, or already convicted and sought for punishment").
38. See Rebane, supra note 33, at 1645 (explaining that extradition spawns as far
back as ancient Egypt and first appeared in Western Europe in twelfth century).
39. See id. (noting that under reciprocity, nations grant extradition requests in ex-
change for extradition or promise of future extradition of individual that they seek
from requesting nations).
40. See id. (explaining that reciprocity formed foundation of extradition practice
before advent of modern extradition treaties).
41. See id. (stating that extraterritoriality refers to sovereign right of each nation to
regulate and govern any activity within its jurisdiction); see alsoJoshua S. Spector, Extra-
diting Mexican Nationals in the Fight Against International Narcotics Crimes, 31 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 1007, 1017 (1998) (explaining that drug trafficking implicates concept of ex-
traterritoriality because effects of international drug trafficking impact requesting na-
tion).
42. See Rebane, supra note 33, at 1646 (explaining that concept of extraterritorial-
ity dictates that each nation's sovereign and territorial integrity supercedes any criminal
conduct triggering invasive enforcement operations). If a nation violates this tenet in-
vasively, then the international community will compel the return of the individual and
fine or reprimand the guilty nation. Id. at 1646-47 n.102.
43. See id. at 1647 (stating that treaty system gained prominence in latenineteenth
century).
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Most current extradition treaties are bilateral. 44 Common extra-
dition treaty features include a dual criminality provision 45 or a
list of specific criminal conduct warranting extradition,46 a
clause addressing the extradition of nationals,47 a list of pro-
tected rights, 48 and a political offense exception. 49  Finally,
although the treaty system, comity,50 and reciprocity dictate in-
ternational extradition procedures, each nation's domestic ex-
tradition process is governed by its own internal laws and poli-
cies. 5
1
Traditionally, common law and civil law nations have had
different extradition procedures.5 2 In both systems, the usual
practice is for a minister or agency of the executive branch to
handle incoming extradition requests. 3 In common law na-
tions, this executive agency usually decides whether to extradite,
contingent upon a judicial finding of treaty compliance. 4 In
contrast, civil law nations often provide exclusive executive con-
trol.55 Further, whereas common law nations require a probable
cause standard for charging the requested individual of the par-
ticular crime, 5 civil law jurisdictions consider the formal extradi-
44. See id. at 1648 (stating that specific criminal trends necessitated creation of
individually-tailored treaties between specified pairs of nations).
45. See id. at 1637 n.9 (noting that dual criminality requires that alleged conduct
motivating crime must be illegal in both requesting and requested nations).
46. Id. at 1649.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.; see BLACK's LAw DICrIONARY 486 (6th ed. 1991) (explaining that political
offense exception is exemption from extradition for individual accused of "crime di-
rected against the security or governmental system of a nation, such as treason, sedi-
tion, or espionage").
50. See Rebane, supra note 33, at 1649 (stating that comity refers to particular re-
quest and is not binding upon international law).
51. Id.
52. See BAssiOUNI, supra note 33, at 7-8 (describing development of extradition in
civil and common law countries).
53. Id. at 505.
54. See Rebane, supra note 33, at 1650-51 (describing U.S. and British domestic
extradition processes as examples of common law tradition). For instance, in the
United States, the Secretary of State renders the final decision to extradite after a re-
viewing court certifies that sufficient evidence exists to extradite the wanted individual.
Id. In the United Kingdom, a Secretary of State decides whether to issue a warrant of
surrender after a special magistrate reviews the request. Id.
55. See id. at 1651 (explaining that most civil law nations now require at least mini-
mal judicial review of extradition process).
56. Id.; BAssiOUNI, supra note 33, at 508.
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tion request prima facie evidence to grant extradition.57
Historically, most nations have prohibited the extradition of
their nationals. 58  The majority of civil law nations, including
most nations in South America, will not extradite their nation-
als.59 These nations fear that their citizens will receive excessive
punishment in the foreign locale or will be at an unfair disadvan-
tage due to unfamiliarity with the foreign process, language, and
customs.6 0 Thus, these nations view extradition as a violation of
sovereignty.61 As a general concession, however, governments
that refuse to extradite their nationals will agree to prosecute the
wanted individual domestically.6 2
2. Modern Extradition Law
In the last half-century, the rise of drug trafficking has led to
an increased use of extralegal means6" to obtain wanted individ-
57. Rebane, supra note 33, at 1651.
58. See Spector, supra note 41, at 1018 (explaining that Mexico traditionally re-
fused to extradite nationals); ETHAN A. NADELMANN, Cops ACROSS BORDERS: THE INTER-
NATIONALIZATION OF U.S. CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 426-27 (1993).
59. See Spector, supra note 41, at 1018 (explaining that civil law nations instead
prefer to prosecute their citizens domestically for crimes committed abroad);
NADELMANN, supra note 58, at 430-34; M. CHERIF BAsSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADI-
TION: UNITED STATES LAw AND PRACTICE 588 (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL
EXTRADITION]; see also Dea Abramschmitt, Neighboring Countries; Un-Neighborly Acts: A
Look at the Extradition Relationships Among the United States, Mexico, and Canada, 4 TRANS-
NAT'L L. & POL' 121, 128-29 (1995) (focusing upon extradition practices of North
American nations).
60. See Spector, supra note 41, at 1018 (explaining that nationals prosecuted in
foreign courts may consider themselves punished from moment of extradition because
they are forcibly transported far from home and family); NADELMANN, supra note 58, at
427.
61. See Spector, supra note 41, at 1018 (explaining civil law rule that foreign na-
tions do not have authority to impose their laws upon civil law nation's national);
NADELMANN, supra note 58, at 427; INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 59, at 593.
62. Spector, supra note 41, at 1019; see G.A. Res. 116, U.N GAOR, 45th Sess., An-
nex, Agenda Item 100, art. 4(a), U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/116 (1991) (resolving that refus-
als to extradite based on nationality are reasonable provided requested state undertakes
appropriate domestic action against wanted individual). This U.N. resolution acknowl-
edges that most nations will not extradite their own nationals and, thus, balances the
use of executive discretion with assurances that the wanted individual will receive ade-
quate penal sanctions. Spector, supra, at 1019.
63. See Abraham Abramovsky, Extraterritorial Abductions: America's "Catch and
Snatch"Policy Run Amok, 31 VA.J. INT'L L. 151, 155-56 (1991) (explaining that extralegal
methods of apprehending foreign suspect can be divided into irregular rendition tech-
niques and extraterritorial abductions). "Irregular rendition" concerns apprehensions
that are conducted with the approval of the rendering, or asylum, nation. Id. "Abduc-
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uals.64 Often, governing extradition treaties lacked provisions
accounting for drug-related offenses.65 Irregular means of ren-
dition, including abduction, 66 formal surrender, and deporta-
tion 67 circumvented this deficiency.68 Even where drug offenses
were enumerated, however, irregular rendition in drug-related
cases often replaced the normal extradition process to obtain
wanted individuals.69
tions," conversely, are committed without the asylum nation's consent or consultation.
Id.
64. See Rebane, supra note 33, at 1668 (noting that exclusion of drug-related of-
fenses in extradition treaties frustrated officials attempting to extradite drug traffick-
ers); see also ETHAN A. NADELMANN, The Evolution of United States Involvement in the Interna-
tional Rendition of Fugitive Criminals, 25 N.Y.U. J. ITrr'L L. & POL'Y 813, 860-65 (1993)
[hereinafter International Rendition] (noting that rise of drug trafficking spurred in-
crease in irregular rendition techniques); Abramovsky, supra note 63, at 1019 (explain-
ing that over last twenty years, extraterritorial abductions of drug traffickers increased
because of growing accounts of terrorism, non-extradition policies in drug producing
nations, fears that extradition targets would be tipped by corrupt officials in asylum
governments, and perceptions that extradition processes were too tedious).
65. See International Rendition, supra note 64, at 847 (explaining that older extradi-
tion treaties did not contain drug-related offenses because narcotics were not regulated
by international conventions at that time); see also Rebane, supra note 33, at 1667-68
(noting that negotiating new provisions often was unsuccessful, leaving officials with
unattractive or legally questionable alternatives).
66. See Rebane, supra note 33, at 1671 (stating that United States often abducts
individuals from Mexico because of long, common borders that both nations share).
The United States operated a program of "informal surrender" throughout the 1970s in
an effort to capture drug traffickers. Id. In the United States, courts do not inquire as
to the method by which jurisdiction was obtained. See Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444
(1886) (holding that power of court is not impaired when faced with criminal defend-
ant seized by forcible abduction); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 523 (1952) (finding
no constitutional prohibition against finding of guilt when criminal defendant forcibly
abducted).
67. See Rebane, supra note 33, at 1671 (explaining that deportation is "quasi-legal"
because it circumvents extradition, but is undertaken with cooperation of requested
nation). A deportee does not have the same legal rights as an extraditee, such as the
political offense exception and the doctrine of specialty. Id. The individual thus is
susceptible to administrative expediency. Id.
68. See id. at 1666 (stating that outdated treaties restricted law enforcement and
promoted irregular rendition). Formal surrender and deportation, although often sus-
picious, do not technically violate international law. Id. Abduction consists of an inva-
sive campaign to kidnap an individual in order to gain jurisdiction and, therefore, vio-
lates international law. Id. See generally Abramovsky, supra note 63, at 151 (arguing that
U.S. irregular rendition techniques violate basic human rights and are illegal); James R.
Edmunds, Nonconsensual United States Military Action Against the Colombian Drug Lords
Under the U.N. Charter, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 129, 149 (1990) (arguing that U.S. irregular
rendition operations occurring in absence of invaded nation's consent violates Article
2(4) of U.N. Charter).
69. See Rebane, supra note 33, at 1669 (describing weaknesses of extradition to
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3. Colombia's Extradition Law
Colombia's modern extradition practice is exemplified by
its treaty relationship with the United States. 70 The most recent
applicable extradition treaty is the Extradition Treaty with the
Republic of Colombia, dated September 14, 1979 ("Colombian
Treaty") .71 The Colombian Treaty provides for the extradition
of wanted individuals who are charged with or convicted of of-
fenses listed in a schedule annexed to the treaty, including drug-
related offenses. 72 Article I of the Colombian Treaty concerns
jurisdiction, permitting extradition even when the offense oc-
curs beyond the territory of the requesting nation.73 Relevant
portions of Article II define extraditable offenses74 and provide a
obtain drug traffickers). Extradition requests are too lengthy, and many nations simply
refuse to extradite their nationals. Id.
70. See generally Igor I. Kavass, Colombia: Supreme Court Decision on the Law Concerning
the Extradition Treaty Between Colombia and the United States, 27 I.L.M. 492 (1988) (arguing
that failure of U.S.-Colombian extradition treaty in 1979 operated as example of Co-
lombian extradition practices in 1980s).
71. Colombian Treaty, supra note 36. But see Kavass, supra note 70, at 497 (arguing
that although U.S. government maintains that treaty is still in force, Colombian
Supreme Court decisions rendered 1979 extradition treaty between Colombia and
United States de facto invalid).
72. See Colombian Treaty, supra note 36, app. (listing extraditable offenses, such as
murder, rape, kidnapping, "[r]eceiving or transporting any money, valuable securities
or other property knowing the same to have been unlawfully obtained," "[a] ny offense
against the laws relating to international trade and transfer of funds," and of particular
concern, "[o]ffenses against the laws relating to the traffic in, possession, or production
or manufacture of, narcotic drugs, cannabis, hallucinogenic drugs, cocaine and its de-
rivatives, and other substances which produce physical or psychological dependence").
73. Id. art. 1. Article 1 states:
(1) The Contracting Parties agree to extradite to each other, subject to the
provisions described in this treaty, persons found in the territory of one of
the Contracting Parties who have been charged with an offense, found
guilty of committing an offense, or are wanted by the other Contracting
Party for the enforcement of a judicially pronounced penalty involving a
deprivation of liberty for an offense, committed within the Requesting
State.
(2) When the offense has been committed outside the territory of the Re-
questing State, the Requested State shall grant extradition, subject to the
provisions of this Treaty, if-
(a) Its laws would provide for the punishment of such an offense in simi-
lar circumstances; or
(b) The person sought is a national of the Requesting State, and that
State has jurisdiction to try that person.
Id.
74. Id. art. 2. Article 2 provides:
(1) Extraditable offenses under this Treaty are:
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dual criminality provision.
Article IV of the Colombian Treaty concerns the political
and military offense exceptions.76  Article V guards against
double jeopardy,77 and Articles VI and VII cover the statute of
limitations78 and capital punishment, 79 respectively. Articles IX
through XVIII delineate the procedures and required docu-
ments necessary to complete an extradition request.8 0 Article
VIII, concerning the extradition of nationals,8 1 is particularly
noteworthy because it obligates the requested nation to extradite
all persons, including nationals, if the underlying offense has al-
ready resulted in a conviction in the requesting nation and if the
(a) offenses described in the Appendix to this Treaty which are punish-
able under the laws of both Contracting Parties; or
(b) offenses, whether listed in the Appendix to this Treaty or not, pro-
vided they are punishable under the Federal Laws of the United
States and the laws of the Republic of Colombia.
Id.
75. See'id. ("Extradition shall be granted in respect of an extraditable offense only
if the offense is punishable under the laws of both Contracting Parties by deprivation of
liberty for a period exceeding one year.").
76. Id. art. 4. Article 4 states:
(1) Extradition shall not be granted when the offense for which extradition is
requested is of a political character or is connected with an offense of a
political character, or when the person whose extradition is requested
proves that the extradition is requested for the exclusive purpose of trying
or punishing that person for an offense of the above-mentioned charac-
ter.
(2) Extradition shall not be granted when the offense for which extradition is
requested is of a purely military nature.
Id.
77. Id. art. 5 ("Extradition shall not be granted when the person sought has been
tried and convicted or acquitted by the Requested State for the offense for which extra-
dition is requested.").
78. See id. art. 6 ("Extradition shall not be granted when the prosecution or the
enforcement of the penalty for the offense for which extradition has been sought has
become barred by lapse of time according to the laws of the Requesting State.").
79. Id. art. 7. Article 7 provides:
When the offense for which extradition is requested is punishable by death
under the laws of the Requesting State and the laws of the Requested State do
not permit such punishment for that offense, extradition may be refused, un-
less, before extradition is granted, the Requesting State furnishes such assur-
ances as the Requested State considers sufficient that the death penalty shall
not be imposed, or, if imposed, shall not be executed.
Id.
80. Id. arts. 9-18.
81. See id. art. 8 ("Neither Contracting Party shall be bound to deliver up its own
nationals, but the executive Authority of the Requested State shall have the power to
deliver them up if, in its discretion, it be deemed proper to do so.").
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offense was intended to be consummated in the requesting na-
tion.8 2 Article VIII additionally provides for domestic investiga-
tion and prosecution if extradition is not granted. 3
At first, commentators considered the Colombian Treaty to
be the answer to the corruption problems caused by drug cartels
in Colombia. 4 Drug barons operated in Colombia with impu-
nity; these drug traffickers feared extradition, however, because
it virtually assured an U.S. prison sentence.85 Yet, many Colom-
bian lawmakers voiced opposition to the Colombian Treaty's ex-
tradition policies, claiming that the extradition of nationals vio-
lated Colombian sovereignty.86 Meanwhile, the supporters of
82. Id.
[E]xtradition of nationals will be granted pursuant to the provision of this
Treaty in the following instances:
(a) Where the offense involves acts taking place in the territory of both
States with the intent that the offense be consummated in the Re-
questing State; or
(b) Where the person for whom extradition is sought has been convicted
in the Requesting State of the offense for which extradition is sought.
Id.
83. See id. ("If extradition is not granted pursuant to paragraph (1) of this Article,
the Requested State shall submit the case to its competent judicial authorities for the
purpose of initiating the investigation or to further the related prosecution, provided
that the Requested State has jurisdiction over the offense.").
84. See Nagle, supra note 27, at 865 (explaining that extradition treaty caused ex-
citement among Colombian reformers because drug traffickers would be sent beyond
their ability to manipulate and corrupt Colombian political system).
85. See Hearings I, supra note 17 (testimony of Mr. "Rodriguez," former Medellin
drug trafficker) (stating that Colombian drug traffickers considered extradition "the
greatest tool or weapon that [U.S.] law enforcement has against drug traffick[ing]"
because of relative integrity of the U.S. legal system). A former Medellin trafficker ex-
plained that "[i] t's the law. The jails as well, of course, but it's the law that is much
more strict and there is no way of fixing it up, as you can do in Colombia with the
authorities that are being paid off." Id.; see Otera, supra note 18, at 968 (stating that
'extradition plucks the trafficker from a familiar society which looks on him as a part of
daily life and places him in the United States, a culture vehemently opposed to drug
trafficking").
86. See Nagle, supra note 27, at 865 (explaining that Colombian President
Betancur immediately challenged Colombian Treaty by refusing to extradite nationals).
For instance, Colombian President Belisario Betancur denied the United States' extra-
dition requests in the early 1980s for Lucas Gomez Van Grieken and Emiro de Jesus
Mejia. Id. This executive decision occurred after the Colombian Supreme Court
granted approval to extradite the two nationals. Id. President Betancur based his deci-
sion on Colombia's tradition of not extraditing its nationals. Id. Many commentators
believed that President Betancur's motivations were political, intending to inspire na-
tionalism and positioning himself as the guardian of Colombian sovereignty. Id. To
many Colombians, the Colombian Treaty interpreted by President Betancur's predeces-
sor symbolized Colombian subservience to U.S. policies and directives. Id. Denying
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the Colombian Treaty who voiced their beliefs8 7 soon became
the victims8 of narco-terrorism. 89
In 1986, the Colombian Supreme Court nullified the law9"
that enabled the Colombian Treaty.91 In 1987, the Court reiter-
ated this position after Colombian President Virgilio Barco Var-
gas promulgated a new law92 to replace the earlier defective
one. 9 3 The Colombian legislature in 1991 ratified a new consti-
extradition requests could provide consolidation for the nation's divided political fac-
tions and solve its domestic narcotics issues. Id. In this latter vein, President Betancur
rejected extradition and instead pursued a policy of increased internal enforcement of
drug production and trafficking. Id.
87. See id. at 866-67 (explaining that those who voiced support for extradition were
killed). For instance, Minister of Justice, Lara Bonilla, stated that:
if our country .. . will retract from its promises which it contracted in the
international fight against delinquency, specifically against narco-trafficking,
we couldn't have the least doubt that the consequences of similar attitudes will
be disastrous in the order of economic cooperation. This will destroy the
credibility of the nation not only in front of the U.S. but in front of all the
countries of the world, and the country will also lose legal and moral authority
to request extradition when the crime is committed in the foreign state. The
country has negated reciprocity that was included in the treaty.
Id.
88. See id. at 867 (describing that assassination of Lara Bonilla was due to his pub-
lic support for extradition). Bonilla's words cost him his life. Id. He was assassinated
shortly thereafter. Id. Most notably, in 1985, a left-wing guerilla movement known as
the M-19 seized the Palace of Justice, where the Colombian Supreme Court sits. Id.
The M-19 is a revolutionary organization established in 1970, committed to "democ-
racy" and "people's rights." Id. at 867 n.65. The guerillas killed more than one hun-
dred people, including almost half of the Supreme Court Justices. Id. at 867.
89. See Bruce Zagaris, Protecting the Rule of Law from Assault in the War Against Drugs
and Narco-Terrorism, 15 NovA L. REv. 703, 707-08 (1991) (stating that narco-terrorism is
role played by drug traffickers in international politics). Narco-terrorists manipulate
sovereignty by compelling their host nations to pursue specific domestic and foreign
policies under threat of violence. Id.
90. LEv 27 DE 1980 (Colom.).
91. See Judgment No. 41, 14JURISPRUDENCIA v DOcrRINA [Jur. Doc.] 1064 (1986)
(holding that Colombian Constitution does not permit President to delegate authority
to conduct international relations to Minister of Government); Kavass, supra note 70, at
496 (explaining that Colombian Supreme Court held Law 27 of 1980 unenforceable
because it had not been approved pursuant to Article 188-7 of the Colombian Constitu-
tion); Stefan A. Riesenfeld, International Decisions, 85 A.J.I.L. 352, 355 (1991) (reporting
that this decision marked shift in Colombian jurisprudence). Before this decision, the
Court treated the approval laws of international agreements as beyond the scope of
their purview. Riesenfeld, supra, at 352. The Court formerly reasoned that the treaty-
making process was the constitutional concern solely of the President and Congress. Id.
In this decision, the Court held that proposed treaties whose text is included in Colom-
bian law are subject to judicial scrutiny as to both substance and form. Id.
92. LEY 68 DE 1986 (Colom.).
93. Kavass, supra note 70, at 496.
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tution, which banned the extradition of nationals altogether.94
Most commentators agree that these decisions were the result of
fear, intimidation, and coercion stemming from the narco-ter-
rorist response to the Colombian Treaty. 5
4. Dominican Republic's Extradition Law
The Dominican Republic also has an extradition treaty with
the United States.96 U.S. extradition requests to the Dominican
Republic are subject to the Convention Between the United
94. See CONSTITUCIO6N POLTICA DE COLOMBIA tit. I, art. 35 (1991) ("Se prohibe la
extradici6n colombianos por nacimiente"). In the interim period between 1987 and
1991, Colombia extradited approximately two dozen nationals. See Riesenfeld, supra
note 91, at 352 (noting that Betancur invoked his emergency powers pursuant to Article
121 of Colombian Constitution to declare "state of siege"). Upon constitutional chal-
lenge, the Colombian Supreme Court later upheld the presidential decree. Id.
In the absence of the treaty, Colombia extradited these individuals according to
the concept of reciprocity. See Nagle, supra note 27, at 855-56 (describing Colombian
domestic extradition procedure in absence of treaty). The power to grant or to refuse
extradition requests lies in a ministerial department of the executive branch subject to
Supreme Court review and approval. CODIGO DE PROCEDIMIENTO PENAL [C6D. PROC.
PEN.] arts. 647-48 (Colom.). This governmental discretion is governed by dual crimi-
nality and a resolution of the accusation pronounced in the requesting state. Id. art.
649. Additional limitations include the specialty doctrine and other stipulations or con-
ditions considered appropriate. Id. After ministerial review, the extradition file is sent
to the Supreme Court. Nagle, supra note 27, at.858. The Court permits all relevant
documentation in the case to be viewed by the requested individual or the individual's
lawyer. Id. After a discovery and allegation period, the Court issues its opinion. COD.
PROC. PEN. art. 659. The Court analyzes the extradition procedures and documentation
to ensure compliance with the Constitution and laws. Nagle, supra note 27, at 858. The
Court also verifies the existence of dual criminality and ensures the completeness and
validity of the writ issued by the requesting state. C6DIGO PENAL CODE arts. 1, 3
(Colom.). The executive, invariably the president, has fifteen days to issue a resolution
granting or denying the extradition request. Nagle, supra note 27, at 858.
95. See Samper Says Final Extradition Vote a 'Victory'Despite Restrictions (BBC Summary
of World Broadcasts, Nov. 28, 1997) [hereinafter Samper] (reporting that fear of narco-
terrorists influenced political atmosphere surrounding Colombian extradition policy in
late 1980s and early 1990s). See generally Kavass, supra note 70, at 496 (describing back-
ground for Colombian Supreme Court decision). As Nagle explained,
[i]t is important to remember that throughout this period, anyone who pub-
licly voiced a pro-extradition opinion was kidnapped or killed. Those whom
the cartels could not buy, died. Those who survived were forced to leave the
country. The drug cartels attempted to turn public opinion against extradi-
tion by terrorizing the nation with bombings of newspapers, public places, and
businesses. The extraditables, as the cartel capos took to calling themselves,
claimed responsibility for much of the terrorism, and promoted their macho
slogan that they would rather have a grave in Colombia than a prison cell in
the United States. They swore to fight extradition to the death.
Nagle, supra note 27, at 869.
96. Dominican Treaty, supra note 36.
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States and the Dominican Republic for the Extradition of
Criminals, proclaimed on August 26, 1910 ("Dominican
Treaty") .9 Article I of the Dominican Treaty provides for extra-
dition contingent upon a finding of dual criminality. 8 Article II
enumerates extraditable offenses, including murder, 99 sex
crimes,1"0 kidnapping, a0 ' embezzlement, 10 2 and receipt of stolen
money or goods.' Article II also inculpates accessories." 4 Sig-
nificantly, Article II does not contain any drug-related of-
fenses. 10
5
97. Id.
98. Id. art. 1. Article I states:
It is agreed that the government of the United States and the Government of
the Dominican Republic shall, upon mutual requisition duly made as herein
provided, deliver up to justice any person who may be charged with, or may
have been convicted of any of the crimes specified in article two of this Con-
vention committed within the jurisdiction of one of the Contracting Parties
while said person was actually within such jurisdiction when the crime was
committed, and who shall seek an asylum or shall be found within the territo-
ries of the other, provided that such surrender shall take place only upon such
evidence of criminality, as according to the laws of the place where the fugitive
or person so charged shall be found, would justify his apprehension and com-
mitment for trial if the crime or offence had been there committed
Id.
99. See id. art. 2 (stating that "[p]ersons shall be delivered according to the provi-
sions of this Convention, who shall have been charged with or convicted of any of the
following crimes... [m]urder, comprehending the crimes designated by the terms of
parricide, assassination, manslaughter, when voluntary, poisoning or infanticide").
100. See id. (stating that "[rape, abortion, [and] carnal knowledge of children
under the age of twelve years" are extraditable offenses).
101. See id. (stating that "[k]idnapping of minors or adults, defined to be the ab-
duction or detention of a person or persons, in order to exact money from them or
their families, or for any other unlawful end" is extraditable offense).
102. Id. Article 2 provides the following definition of embezzlement:
Embezzlement or criminal malversation committed within the jurisdiction of
one or the other party by public officers or depositaries, where the amount
embezzled exceeds two hundred dollars.
Embezzlement by any person or persons hired, salaried or employed. To the
detriment of their employers or principals, when the crime or offence is pun-
ishable by imprisonment or other corporal punishment by the laws of both
countries, and where the amount embezzled exceeds two hundred dollars.
Id.
103. See id. (stating that "[o]btaining money, valuable securities or other property
by false pretenses or receiving any money, valuable securities or other property knowing
the same to have been unlawfully obtained, where the amount of money or value of the
property so obtained or received exceeds two hundred dollars" is extraditable offense).
104. See id. ("The extradition is also to take place for participation in any of the
aforesaid crimes as an accessory before or after the fact, provided such participation be
punishable by imprisonment by the laws of both Contracting Parties.").
105. See id. (lacking any reference to "drugs" or "narcotics").
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While Article III of the Dominican Treaty defines and pro-
vides a political offense exception,' °6 Articles IV and V establish
the specialty doctrine 10 7 and statute of limitations, 108 respec-
tively. Article VI dictates that wanted individuals are not extra-
ditable if they are currently being prosecuted or are incarcerated
in the requested nation for crimes committed there. 09 Last, Ar-
ticle VIII, although presented in the negative, allows for the ex-
tradition of nationals subject to executive discretion."0
In 1969, the Dominican legislature nullified the discretion-
ary authority granted to the executive in Article VIII of the Do-
minican Treaty when it passed Law 489 of the Domestic Penal
Law ("Law 489").111 Law 489 prohibited the extradition of Do-
minican nationals," 2 thus providing a safe refuge for Dominican
criminals who committed crimes in the United States and fled
106. Id. art. 3. Article 3 provides:
The provisions of this Convention shall not import claim of extradition for any
crime or offence of a political character, nor for acts connected with such
crimes or offences; and no persons surrendered by or to either of the Con-
tracting Parties in virtue of this Convention shall be tried or punished for a
political crime or offence. When the offence charged comprises the act either
of murder or assassination or of poisoning, either consummated or attempted,
the fact that the offence was committed or attempted against the life of the
Sovereign or Head of a foreign State or against the life of any member of his
family, shall not be deemed sufficient to sustain that such a crime or offence
was of a political character, or was an act connected with crimes or offences of
a political character.
Id.
107. See id. art. 4 ("No person shall be tried for any crime or offence other than
that for which he was surrendered.").
108. See id. art. 5 ("A fugitive criminal shall not be surrendered under the provi-
sions hereof, when, from lapse of time ... the criminal is exempt from prosecution or
punishment for the offence for which the surrender is asked.").
109. Id. art. 6. Article 6 states:
If a fugitive criminal whose surrender may be claimed pursuant to the stipula-
tions hereof, be actually under prosecution, out on bail or in custody, for a
crime or offence committed in the country where he has sought asylum, or
shall have been convicted thereof, his extradition may be deferred until such
proceedings be determined, and, until he shall have been set at liberty in due
course of law.
Id.
110. See id. art. 8 ("Under the stipulations of this convention, neither of the Con-
tracting Parties shall be bound to deliver up its own citizens or subjects.").
111. No. 489 LEY DE EXTRADiCci6N DEL 22 DE OCrUBRE DE 1969 (Dom. Rep.).
112. See id. art. 4 ("La extradici6n de un dominicano no se conceder-A por ningfin
motivo").
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back to their homeland.' 13 U.S. interest in extraditing Domini-
cans114 has increased recently because of the explosion of the
narcotic trade in the Dominican Republic"' and because of the
role Dominicans play in the distribution of drugs in U.S. urban
centers." 6 Efforts by the United States to revise the Dominican
Treaty in order to effectuate extradition have been frustrated by
various factors.' 17
B. The Roles of Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and the United
States in Drug Trafficking
Commentators have acknowledged that international drug
trafficking and anti-drug enforcement policies impact extradi-
tion practice between the United States, Colombia, and the Do-
minican Republic, respectively." 8 Drug trafficking is a major il-
legal enterprise, constantly expanding in scope and profitabil-
ity." 9 Colombia is the world's leading supplier of cocaine,
posing enforcement difficulties for its own government as well as
for other nations and the international community. 2 ° The Do-
minican Republic serves as a gateway for Colombian drug ship-
113. See Fineman III, supra note 27, at A5 (reporting that Law 489 transformed
Dominican Republic into one of world's major havens from U.S. law).
114. See Smith, supra note 14, at 38 (reporting that Dominican officials historically
denied U.S. agencies seeking extradition of Dominicans).
115. See Hearings III, supra note 20 (testimony of Thomas A. Constantine, DEA
Administrator) (noting that in 1990s, Dominican and Colombian traffickers collabo-
rated on hundreds of smuggling operations through Dominican territory).
116. See id. (reporting that Dominican drug gangs control U.S. east coast cities,
such as Boston, New York, Newark, Charlotte, and Miami, by directing sales involving
hundreds of kilos of cocaine and heroin).
117. See Fineman II, supra note 27, at A4 (reporting that Dominican Republic de-
nies U.S. extradition demands out of resentment for U.S. foreign policies in Carib-
bean); Fineman III, supra note 27, atA5 (stating that Dominicans deny U.S. extradition
requests because they view extradition as violation of sovereignty).
118. See Otera, supra note 18, at 975 (noting that in 1980s and 1990s, Colombian
drug traffickers' influence over judiciary impacted use of extradition).
119. See PAUL B. STARES, THE GLOBAL DRUG PHENOMENON: IMPLICATIONS FOR POL-
icy 4-6 (1995) (explaining that financial rewards for drug traffickers compel develop-
ment of new strategies and expansion into new markets).
120. See Abeyratne, supra note 17, at 302-05 (describing Colombian cocaine pro-
duction and trafficking to different regions of world and suggesting reforms in interna-
tional airspace controls in order to curb such trafficking). In the 1990s, Colombia sup-
plied cocaine to North America, Europe, Asia, and Australia, using Central America,
the Caribbean, the Middle East, and Africa as transit points. Id. Colombian drug en-
forcement seized 32 metric tons of cocaine in 1996. Id. Colombian drug cartels pro-
duced an estimated 600 metric tons of cocaine the following year. Id.; see Hearings I,
supra note 17 (statement of Rep. McCollum) (providing statistical data concerning Co-
2392 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 22:2373
ments,' 2 ' and many Dominican nationals oversee or personally
effect the distribution of cocaine in U.S. urban centers, such as
New York City.1 2 2 As a response to the roles that these two na-
tions play in the drug trafficking business, the United States has
developed numerous methods to enforce its own anti-drug pol-
icy.123
1. Historical Development of Illegal Drug Trafficking
The use of mind-altering substances to alleviate pain and
provide an escape from reality has existed throughout history. 124
Drug abuse has expanded since the mid-1800s due to an in-
creased availability of drugs, changing socioeconomic factors,
rapid urbanization, and the growth of criminal elements in soci-
ety. 125 By the early twentieth century, the proliferation of drug
trafficking for non-medical purposes necessitated the creation of
international drug control conventions. 126 By the mid-1990s, the
lombian cocaine production in order to contextualize role of Colombia in international
drug trafficking).
121. See Fineman, supra note 24, at A10 (reporting that Dominican Republic's
long coastline is difficult to police, enhancing its position as transit point for drug ship-
ments).
122. See Wren, supra note 2, at Al (reporting that Dominicans occupy specific
roles in domestic drug trafficking). By 1997, Dominican gang members had come to
dominate the middle echelon of drug dealing in New York, receiving cocaine and her-
oin from Colombian wholesalers and distributing the drugs to street dealers or selling
the drugs on their own. Id.
123. See generally Sherman, supra note 23, at 698 (arguing that U.S. irregular rendi-
tion techniques such as deportation, exclusion, and abduction, which developed in re-
sponse to international drug trafficking, are collusively performed with Colombian gov-
ernment agencies).
124. See Abeyratne, supra note 17, at 290 (explaining that early societal cultural
institutions were largely based on the existence of mind-altering substances); DECLARA-
TION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON DRUG ABUSE AND ILLICIT TRAFFICKING AND
COMPREHENSIVE MULTIDISCIPLINARY OUTLINE OF FUTURE AGrIVITIES IN DRUG ABUSE CON-
TROL, U.N. Div. of Narc. Drugs at 5, U.N. Doc. ST/N/14, U.N. Sales No. E. 88 xl. 1
(1988) [hereinafter DECLARATION]. See generally Richard Bell, The History of Drug Prohibi-
tion and Legislation, INTERPOL Ir'L CrIM. POLICE REv., Sept.-Oct. 1991, at 2 (recounting
that different societies throughout history incorporated drug use into their respective
cultures).
125. DECLARATION, supra note 124, at 6.
126. See R.K. Newman, Opium Smoking in Late Imperial China: A Reconsideration, 29
MOD. ASIAN STUD. 765 (1995) (noting that opium drug trade in nineteenth century
China prompted international responses); see also Abeyratne, supra note 17, at 291-95
(explaining that Shanghai Commission was unprecedented achievement in field of
multilateral drug enforcement cooperation). The Shanghai Commission in 1909 rec-
ognized China's right to eradicate opium production and use. Abeyratne, supra, at 291.
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production of illegal narcotics and psychotropic substances were
at record highs. 127
2. Colombia's Role in Illegal Drug Trafficking
Colombia is the world's leading supplier of processed co-
caine. 128 Most of the cocaine base comes from Peru and Bolivia
and is processed into cocaine by Colombian drug traffickers.1
29
Colombian efforts to curtail drug production have proven inef-
fective. a3° Furthermore, the massive exportation of cocaine and
heroin' from Colombia poses almost insurmountable chal-
lenges to U.S. efforts to enforce its anti-drug policy.'
32
The United States remains the principal market for co-
caine. 3 3 The cocaine travels via international air corridors over
127. Abeyratne, supra note 17, at 298.
128. See id. at 302 (explaining that Colombian drug cartels obtain most of cocaine
from Peru or Bolivia and then process it into cocaine HCL); see Otera, supra note 18, at
957 ("Although Colombia grows relatively little coca, the plant from which cocaine is
refined, it dominates cocaine processing and distribution.").
129. See Abeyratne, supra note 17, at 299 (explaining that Peru's estimated coca
cultivation in 1992 ranged from 129,000 to 350,000 hectares); see also Otera, supra note
18, at 957 (explaining that throughout 1980s and 1990s, ten or twelve highly organized
drug cartels controlled purchase of coca leaves from Peruvian and Bolivian farmers).
For an intricately detailed description of how a typical Colombian drug cartel operates,
see Hearings I, supra note 17 (testimony of Mr. "Rodriguez," former Medellin drug traf-
ficker).
130. See Hearings III, supra note 20 (testimony of Thomas A. Constantine, DEA
Administrator) (explaining that corruption in Colombian police force challenges drug
eradication and control); Abeyratne, supra note 17, at 299 (reporting that Colombian
cocaine seizures dropped to 32 metric tons in 1997 from approximately 77 metric tons
previous year). Colombian inability to curb cocaine trafficking could be explained as
the result of shifting enforcement resources to the destruction of the nation's rapidly
expanding opium poppy crop. Abeyratne, supra, at 299.
131. See Abeyrame, supra note 17, at 299 (reporting that during 1995, Near East,
Southwest Asia, Southeast Asia, Mexico, and Colombia remained principal regions of
illicit poppy cultivation). Despite eradication and crop substitution programs carried
out in these regions, the total illegal production of opium was estimated to exceed 4000
tons. Id. Colombia's opium production alone in 1992 was an estimated 200 tons. Id.
132. See Otera, supra note 18, at 961-62 (arguing that U.S. eradication efforts to
curtail drug production in 1980s and 1990s in Colombia failed). In the 1980s, the
United States spent over US$10 billion to limit drug trafficking in Colombia. Id. Over
this same time period, the number of coca fields in the Andes Mountains increased by
250%, and the supply of cocaine in the United States increased tenfold. Id.
133. See id. at 957 (reporting that nearly all cocaine in United States originated in
Colombia); Hearings III, supra note 20 (testimony of Thomas A. Constantine, DEA Ad-
ministrator) (describing Colombian impact on illegal U.S. drug consumption). One
DEA administrator has remarked that Colombian traffickers "control the manufacture
of the vast majority of cocaine in South America and their fingerprints are on virtually
every kilogram of cocaine sold in U.S. cities and towns." Hearings III, supra (testimony
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Cuba and land routes through Mexico.1 1 4 Paradoxically, when
U.S. anti-drug policy succeeds, cocaine use remains steady and
cocaine prices increase.1 31
3. The Dominican Republic's Role in Illegal Drug Trafficking
In the early 1990s, Colombia's drug barons targeted the
Dominicans as potential partners.'36 The Dominican Republic's
proximity to Colombia and the United States, coupled with a
corrupt and poorly outfitted military, made the Dominican Re-
public a drug dealer's paradise. 137 By Spring 1995, Colombian
cartels had firmly established links in the Dominican Repub-
lic. 138
of Thomas A. Constantine, DEA Administrator); VINCENT T. BUGLIOSI, THE PHOENIX
SOLUTION 34 (1996) (reporting that in 1996, U.S. drug users consumed approximately
75% of world's cocaine supply despite comprising only five percent of world's popula-
tion); see Abeyratne, supra note 17, at 303 (noting that Colombian drug cartels have also
targeted Europe). During 1994, European law enforcement seized over 19 tons of co-
caine with record seizures in France, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom.
Abeyratne, supra, at 304:
134. See Abeyratne, supra note 17, at 303 (describing Mexican seizures of Colom-
bian cocaine). During 1992, Mexican authorities seized almost 40 tons of South Ameri-
can cocaine destined for the United States. Id.
135. See id. (explaining that successful law enforcement operations against Cali
cartel from 1992 to 1993, combined with capture or surrender of several cartel leaders,
led to sharp price increase in United States for cocaine during second quarter of 1994).
136. See Larry Rohter & Clifford Krauss, Dominicans Allow Drugs Easy Sailing, N.Y.
TIMES, May 10, 1998, at Al (reporting that once Mexicans began rivaling Colombians in
drug trafficking, Colombian drug lords began to look to Dominicans as more reliable
partners). According to a former Colombian drug trafficker, the Dominican Republic
was "excellent" because "you don't have any problems with your merchandise. Getting
the money out is easy." Id. The Dominican authorities were so incapable and inexperi-
enced, "you don't even have to pay for protection." Id.
137. Id.
138. See id. (describing that Colombian drug cartels' infiltration into Dominican
society affected Dominican consumer and financial institutions, such as shopping cen-
ters and banks). A DEA administrator recently noted that
[t] rust, the essential ingredient in forging a successful business relationship in
the drug underworld, has already been established between Dominican and
Colombian traffickers through relationships formed during hundreds of
smuggling ventures in the Caribbean and through their long established rela-
tionships in New York, Newark, and Boston. Dominican groups are now a
major force in the major East Coast cities. From Boston, Massachusetts to
Charlotte, North Carolina, well organized Dominican trafficking groups are,
for the first time, controlling and directing the sale of multi-hundred kilo ship-
ments of cocaine and multi-kilogram quantities of heroin. Their influence,
moreover, has spread beyond the big city landscape into the smaller cities and
towns along the East Coast.
Hearings III, supra (testimony of Thomas A. Constantine, DEA Administrator).
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The Dominican Republic served as a transit point for Co-
lombian drug shipments in the 1990s. 131 Colombian military of-
ficials aided Dominican traffickers by selling the coordinates of
U.S. and Dominican vessels on patrol in the Caribbean.140 Multi-
ton drug cargoes of cocaine were dropped onto isolated
stretches of Dominican beach.'
Dominican drug dealers also influenced street distribu-
tion. 4 2 In the 1990s, Dominicans became the primary sellers for
Colombians seeking drug distribution in major cities, such as
Miami or New York.'43 Colombian producers favored Domini-
can drug gangs because they were cheap' 4 4 and determined to
make the necessary concessions to advance their trade.145 As a
result, Dominican gangs quickly took over the middle echelon in
the violent world of drug dealing on New York City streets.1 4 6
4. The United States' Anti-Drug Policies in Colombia and the
Dominican Republic
U.S. anti-drug policies respond to the different roles that
Colombia and the Dominican Republic occupy in drug traffick-
ing.'47  While Colombians upset law enforcement efforts
139. See Hearings III, supra note 20 (testimony of Thomas A. Constantine, DEA
Administrator) (describing relationship of Colombia with distributor nations). Mexi-
cans formerly were the main distributors of Colombian cocaine, and Mexico continues
to be the main transfer point for 50% of the Colombian cocaine entering the United
States as of 1998. Id. Colombian cocaine producers rely on Mexico's established distri-
bution routes to reach points throughout the United States. Id.
140. See Rohter & Krauss, supra note 136, at Al (quoting former trafficker saying
"[y]ou can get eight days of information for $5,000 .... Without that information, we
wouldn't have been able to do what we did").
141. Id.
142. See Hearings III, supra note 20 (testimony of Thomas A. Constantine, DEA
Administrator) (noting that Dominicans maintain strong influence over distribution of
drugs within U.S. urban centers). Whereas Colombian drug traffickers dominate the
wholesale distribution of cocaine, Dominican gangs have taken over the "retail" aspect,
selling crack and cocaine on street corners or hiring others to do it for them. Id.
143. See Hearings I, supra note 17 (testimony of Mr. "Rodriguez," former Medellin
drug trafficker) (describing role of Dominican drug dealers for Colombian drug car-
tels). A former Medellin cartel member noted that in the late 1990s, virtually every New
York drug distributor working for the cartel was Dominican. Id.
144. See Rohter & Krauss, supra note 136, at Al (stating that Dominican dealers
only required 25% commissions or cash rather than merchandise).
145. Id.
146. Wren, supra note 2, at Al.
147. See Abeyratne, supra note 17, at 299, 302 (reporting that Colombia is world's
leading supplier of processed cocaine and among leaders in heroin); Fineman, supra
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through their enormous supplication of cocaine, 148 Dominicans
caused different challenges by distributing the Colombian co-
caine on U.S. street corners.149
a. U.S. Anti-Drug Policies in Colombia
While Colombian drug barons grew in international power
and influence,15 the United States maintained its interdiction
and eradication policies.151 Although the number of drug
seizures rose and the federal drug budget grew from US$1.5 bil-
lion in 1981 to US$13.2 billion in 1995,152 the price of a kilo of
cocaine fell as a result of the widespread availability of drugs. 5 '
The challenges of tracking an entire seaboard, shifting air
routes, and crafty smugglers have proven difficult to over-
come. 154
note 24, at Al0 (reporting that Dominican Republic's location and size make it effective
transit point for Colombian drug shipments); Wren, supra note 2, at Al (explaining
that Dominican drug gangs control distribution of cocaine in cities such as New York).
148. Abeyratne, supra note 17, at 302-05.
149. Wren, supra note 2, at Al; Hearings I, supra note 17 (statement of Rep. McCol-
lum).
150. See SaraJankiewicz, Glasnost and the Growth of Global Organized Crime, 18 Hous.
J. INT'L L. 215, 249 (1995) (reporting global influence of Colombian drug cartels).
"Operation Green Ice" in September 1992 evidenced Colombia's growing influence.
One of the biggest international anti-drug operations in history, Operation Green Ice
involved eight countries and 45 undercover DEA and Italian agents. Id. The investiga-
tion revealed that the Sicilian Mafia had established links with the Mafia in the United
States and the drug lords of Colombia. Id.
151. See DianaJean Schemo, Congress Steps Up Aid to Combat Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
1, 1998, at A14 (reporting that primary goal of 1999 U.S. Congressional aid, in form of
upgraded and better-armed helicopters, was directed at aerial eradication of Colom-
bian drug crops).
152. See generally BUGLIOSI, supra note 133, at 13 (arguing that U.S. Congressional
efforts to fight international drug trafficking are fiscally mismanaged); see also Schemo,
supra note 151, at A14 (reporting that U.S. Congressional aid to Colombia for 1999
totaled US$289 million). The Congressional aid more than doubled the US$124 mil-
lion requested by the White House and three times the US$88.6 million offered in
1998. Schemo, supra, at A14.
153. BuGuosI, supra note 133, at 13.
154. See id. (stating that United States stops only five to seven percent of smuggled
cocaine from entering its borders). One DEA spokesman has commented that
although "[wie win battles . . . they win the war." Id.; see Hearings III, supra note 20
(testimony of Thomas A. Constantine, DEA Administrator) (describing challenges in
implementing anti-drug law enforcement policy concerning Colombia). DEA officials
have admitted that Colombian drug trafficking methods
are as varied as one can imagine and traffickers frequently vary their routes
and modus operandi to thwart interdiction techniques. Colombian transporta-
tion groups have honed their skills and tactics to the point that law enforce-
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Historically, commentators criticized U.S. funding for Co-
lombian counter-drug measures as inadequate, 55 impractical 56
or irrelevant. 1 7  Furthermore, U.S. certification policies im-
pacted the availability of economic aid by wedding the enforce-
ment of anti-drug policy to favorable trade status. 5 8 Finally,
commentators noted that U.S. anti-drug funding policies often
upset the Colombian domestic anti-drug policing structure by
providing aid only to certain Colombian institutions, to the det-
ment has little chance of interdicting shipments of cocaine, unless intelligence
is developed pinpointing specific shipments or methods.
Hearings III, supra (testimony of Thomas A. Constantine, DEA Administrator).
155. See Williams & Williams, supra note 18, at 1122 (arguing that U.S. inade-
quately funded "War on Drugs" in late 1980s and early 1990s). In 1989, President Bush
introduced a plan that sought to reduce the cocaine production in source countries.
Id. Yet, many commentators questioned whether the US$261.2 million requested to
fund efforts in Colombia and other source countries were reasonable estimates. Id.
Colombian officials voiced concern over the adequacy of their portion. Id. As one
editor of a Bogota daily remarked, Colombia was "getting the very, very short end of the
stick .... Out of nearly $8 billion, Colombia gets $80 million? That is a very short end.
Too much blood is being spilled here for $80 million." Id. at 1123 n.21 (citations omit-
ted). Further, Colombia's national debt in 1990 was US$16 billion, and it was estimated
that 42% of all Colombian export earnings were earmarked for that expense. Id. at
1124. Thus, even if U.S. aid seemed substantial, it may have been small in comparison
to the gaping need for financial assistance to fight drug trafficking. Id.
156. See id. at 1124 (explaining that Colombian criticism focused on United States'
emphasis on long-term solutions without attending to immediate needs). For example,
the United States shipped US$65 million in emergency aid to Colombia in 1989. Id.
The Colombians requested surveillance, tracking devices, bomb detectors, and equip-
ment for tracing phone calls and scrambling police phone calls to prevent interception.
Id. Instead, the U.S. sent eight A-37 subsonic jets. Id. The jets were useless, however,
because there were no longer any airstrips in most of the drug trafficking transport
areas. Id. Indeed, one U.S. official admitted that despite its reception as a symbolic
gift, "the package did not have a whole lot of what the police would like to have." Id.
(citation omitted).
157. See id. at 1123 (reporting that US$80 million in U.S. aid offered in 1990-9191
was invalidated by U.S. involvement in dissolution of international coffee agreement
worth US$500 million per annum to Colombia). As a result, legitimate farmers had
fewer non-drug crops left to sustain themselves economically. Id. Further, the cocaine
trade yields more than three times the coffee trade. Id. Thus, even if law enforcement
efforts were successful, a sudden halt in the drug trade could cause a deleterious effect
on the Colombian economy. Id.
158. See Hearings II, supra note 18 (testimony of Rensselaer W. Lee, Global Advi-
sor) (pointing out that U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assests Control
("OFAC") prohibited U.S. citizens from conducting business with approximately 110
legitimate Colombian companies because those companies qualified as susceptible to
narcotics trafficking); Williams & Williams, supra note 18, at 1126 (arguing that U.S.
government withholds foreign aid as "punishment" for those who fail to accede to U.S.
anti-drug programs). In this sense, the U.S. "decertifying" tactic invalidates efforts to
assist Colombia to fight drug trafficking. Id.
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riment of others. 15 9
b. U.S. Anti-Drug Policies in the Dominican Republic
The United States also employed interdiction and eradica-
tion techniques to combat Dominican inter-border drug smug-
gling. 6 ° Since the majority of wanted Dominicans drug dealers
violated U.S. state laws, however, they were attacked at the mu-
nicipal level.'61 When wanted Dominican drug dealers fled U.S.
cities for their homeland, local law enforcement then relied
upon diplomatic channels to produce results. 6 2 Until recently,
however, U.S. diplomatic pressure on the Dominican Republic
has proved to be an ineffective method to apprehend wanted
criminals. 163
Commentators observed that efforts to obtain Dominicans
159. See Williams & Williams, supra note 18, at 1122 (reporting that before 1990,
local police agencies undertook almost all Colombian anti-drug law enforcement, while
armed forces guarded against invasion). The United States consistently offered the
armed forces a major share of the anti-drug money for the region, thus upsetting the
roles of these different Colombian institutions. Id.
160. See Douglas Farah, Drug Traffickers Claim Caribbean Routes, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
Sept. 25, 1996, at News Section (stating that DEA funding for interdiction operations in
Caribbean dropped from US$1.03 billion in 1992 to US$569 million in 1995); America
in War on Drugs in CentralAmerica, AGENCE FRANCE PREssE,June 1, 1992, at News Section
(reporting that DEA launched two-year operation in 1992, costing US$30 million in
which Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Jamaica received dozen Black Hawk heli-
copters). The DEA uses these helicopters to intercept drug traffickers at sea or on
hidden landing strips. Id.
161. See Rafael A. Olmeda, Accused Killer Escapes Extradition, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20,
1995, Suburban Section, at 1 (describing New York City Police Department investiga-
tion of Dominican murderer).
162. See id. (reporting that New York City detective seeking Dominican murderer
who fled back to Dominican Republic contacted U.S. State and Justice Departments in
order to apprehend fugitive).
163. See Mike McAlary, Thanksgiving a Sad Marker Day Tainted While Mom's Slayer Is
Free, DAILY NEws, Nov. 28, 1997, at 8 (explaining that Dana Ayala murder case serves as
typical example of Dominican fleeing United States and escaping U.S. penal sanctions).
In the 1993 Dana Ayala murder case, Angel Bienvenido Reinoso murdered Ayala, his
estranged wife, during her family's Thanksgiving Day meal. Id. He had moved out
months earlier, after living with Ayala for two years. Id. On Thanksgiving Day, 1993,
Ayala allowed Reinoso to join the family meal. Id. Reinoso initially acted well-behaved
and festive. Id. In the afternoon, however, Reinoso's mood changed. Id. He walked
into the bedroom, turned the music up, and began to argue with his wife. Id. While
Ayala's daughter watched from the doorway, Reinoso pulled out his gun and shot Ayala
in the neck. Id. Ayala hung on for a few months before dying from the gunshot. Id.
After a New York newspaper ran a picture of Reinoso, he fled to the Dominican Repub-
lic. Id. Eventually, Dominican authorities caught Reinoso, but U.S. extradition re-
quests have so far been refused. Id.
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failed because U.S. municipal law enforcement officials received
insufficient support or direction from the U.S. Department of
State.' Local criminals did not seem to stir much interest in
the U.S. Justice or State Departments. 165 Since Dominican extra-
dition requests were repeatedly rejected, 166 only cases involving
high public demand received much official support.1 6
7
Commentators further noted that although U.S. diplomats
appeared to respect Caribbean sovereignty, when Caribbean na-
tions denied requests for the return of fugitives, law enforce-
ment agencies circumvented the sovereignty issue.' 68 The rise of
irregular abduction reflected this trend. 69 Last, U.S. anti-nar-
cotics efforts have even included targeting Dominican political
parties 17 and performing covert operations during Dominican
election campaigns.
17 1
164. See id. (reporting that one commentator noted, "Americans want to do a lot
to help one mother with seven kids this Thanksgiving, but the American government
has to be prodded to help five kids capture their mother's killer.").
165. See id. (reporting that Benny Tirado, detective assigned to Ayala case, ex-
plained that "[he] started by writing a letter to the President Clinton [sic], then got
passed down to the Department ofJustice and the State Department. No one cared.").
166. See Olmeda, supra note 161, at 1 (quoting U.S. Justice Department as stating
that it is "unlikely" that Dominican Republic would extradite Reinoso). In a letter to
Tirado, the State Department gave its condolences, adding that the Dominican Repub-
lic has the legal discretion not to extradite its own nationals. Id.
167. See id. (reporting that Ayala's brother remarked that if Reinoso had killed
police officer, federal government "would have had him over here already. I guess a
Puerto Rican mother with five kids is not that important to them.").
168. Id.; United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
169. Fineman II, supra note 27, at A4. See generally Abramovsky, supra note 63, at
151 (arguing that U.S. illegal rendition techniques are illegal).
170. See Rohter & Krauss, supra note 136, at Al (reporting that Federal drug
agents and local law enforcement officials have identified Dominican political party
branches and leaders throughout Northeastern United States). For instance, the DEA
has identified Worcester, Massachusetts as the Dominican Revolutionary Party
("P.R.D.") New England headquarters and as a major drug distribution center. Id. The
DEA also claims that local party officials in New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania,
some of who have previous drug convictions, are also involved in such activities. Id.
171. See id. (reporting U.S. undercover operations in 1996 Dominican presidential
campaign). During a 1996 Dominican campaign stop in New York City, the U.S. gov-
ernment took the unusual step of organizing a sting operation to determine whether
one of the candidates, Pena Gomez, and his party were involved in drug trafficking. Id.
At a rally at the Washington Heights, New York headquarters of the P.R.D., undercover
DEA agents posing as members of a Colombian drug cartel offered Gomez's staff
US$50,000. Id. US$250,000 would follow each month if Gomez, once elected, would
agree to allow five planeloads of drugs to land unobstructed in the Dominican Repub-
lic. Id. Although Gomez eventually rejected the overture, U.S. suspicions returned
when the DEA detained several of his party members with a shipment of 778 pounds of
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C. Competing Considerations Affecting Colombian and Dominican
Extradition Policies
Historically, U.S. efforts to extradite Colombian or Domini-
can nationals who fled to their home country competed against
various obstacles related to drug trafficking or anti-drug enforce-
ment. 172 In Colombia, drug traffickers and narco-guerillas 173
supported a reign of violence and corruption to ensure that anti-
drug efforts to create a pro-extradition policy failed.1 74 Further-
more, Colombia viewed U.S. anti-drug efforts and certification
policies as an attack on their sovereignty, thus harming the cred-
ibility of a U.S.-backed extradition movement.1 75 In the Domini-
can Republic, governmental corruption fueled by increasing
drug profits impeded the successful implementation of laws per-
mitting the extradition of nationals. 176 Moreover, as in Colom-
cocaine later that year. Id. In response, Gomez wrote a letter of protest to President
Clinton. Id. In an interview, Gomez attributed this case to a political vendetta against
his party. Id. "'An accusation like this can destroy a person in this country,'" he said,
"'and that's what my enemies are trying to do to me. I was the victim of a campaign in
which false denunciations were made to middle-level American officials in an effort to
involve me in this.'" Id.
172. See Smith, supra note 14, at 38 ("The Dominican Republic has for years rebuf-
fed as intrusive U.S. efforts to extradite dozens of fugitives hiding in the Caribbean
nation."); Fineman, supra note 24, at A10 (reporting frustration of U.S. officials who
seek extradition of Dominican nationals). See generally Krohne, supra note 32, at 159
(describing failure to extradite Colombian nationals as result of Colombian internal
violence and degradation of rule of law); Matorin, supra note 32, at 907 (describing
general ineffectiveness of extradition treaties with countries involved in narcotics
trade); Sherman, supra note 23, at 698 (describing failure to extradite Colombian na-
tionals due to lack of rule of law in Colombia).
173. See McCaffrey Says All the Right Things; Drugs 'Czar' Says Washington Could Do
More to Help, LAT. AMER. WEEKLY REP., Oct. 28, 1997, at 508 [hereinafter McCaffrey]
(explaining that "narco-guerillas" is term used to describe guerilla organizations that
enter into relationships with drug cartels); see also David Adams, Colombia: No Ordinary
War, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 3, 1998, at Al (reporting that one narco-guerilla or-
ganization in particular earns US$22 million per month from drug trade).
174. See Sherman, supra note 23, at 669 (stating that in 1980s and 1990s, Colom-
bian drug cartels bribed, threatened, or killed lawyers and judges in order to prevent
extradition).
175. See Williams & Williams, supra note 18, at 1129 (noting that Colombians view
extradition as violation of sovereignty); see also Mark S. Zaid, Military Might Versus Sover-
eign Right: The Kidnapping of Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain and the Resulting Fallout, 19
Hous. J. INr'L L. 829, 847 (1997) (stating that U.S. anti-drug abduction policies weak-
ens its relations with Colombia); Hearings II, supra note 18 (testimony of Rensselaer W.
Lee, Global Advisor) (arguing that decertification causes U.S. animosity in Colombia).
176. See Rohter & Krauss, supra note 136, at Al (reporting that Dominican drug
gangs in United States launder money into Colombian financial institutions as well as
directly into politician's pockets).
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bia, the Dominican Republic perceived U.S. operations in the
Caribbean as a violation of their sovereign authority. 77 Yet, de-
spite these impediments, forces both within and beyond these
nations' borders operated to promote extradition reform.17
1. Factors Affecting Colombian Extradition Reform
The creation of a pro-extradition policy in Colombia faced
numerous challenges. 179 Various factors related to both drug
trafficking and anti-drug policy operated to obstruct the creation
of an extradition reform that provided for the extradition of na-
tionals.' ° Simultaneously, however, shifting circumstances both
within and outside of Colombia promoted a pro-extradition
movement.' 8'
a. Anti-Extradition Factors
For years, several factors impeded the formation of a Co-
lombian extradition policy that allowed for the extradition of na-
177. See Fineman III, supra note 27, at A5 (reporting that U.S. efforts to extradite
Dominicans were denied because of Dominican belief that extradition is violation of
sovereignty).
178. See Samper, supra note 95 (reporting that in mid-1990s, lawmakers began to
alter their opinions of extradition within anti-drug context); Williams & Williams, supra
note 18, at 1125-26, 1132 (arguing that U.S. relationship with Colombia improved when
United States focused upon multilateral mechanisms in order to effect anti-drug pol-
icy); see also Fineman II, supra note 27, at A4 (reporting that Dominican lawmakers in
late 1990s recognized that extradition is necessary to combat drug trafficking); Rohter
& Krauss, supra note 136, at Al (stating that President Fernandez promoted extradition
reform as part of political agenda).
179. See Sherman, supra note 23, at 698 (stating that lack of rule of law in Colom-
bia during early 1990s obstructed extradition reform); Nagle, supra note 27, at 856
(arguing that Colombian drug cartels promoted violence in order to dissuade extradi-
tion reform).
180. See Sherman, supra note 23, at 698 (observing that narco-terrorism impeded
extradition); Hearings III, supra note 20 (testimony of Thomas A. Constantine, DEA
Administrator) (stating that narco-guerillas challenged Colombian anti-drug enforce-
ment agencies); Williams & Williams, supra note 18, at 1129 (observing that nearly sev-
enty percent of Colombian society in 1988 did not want extradition policy that applies
to Colombian nationals); Hearings II, supra note 18 (testimony of Rensselaer W. Lee,
Global Advisor) (reporting that U.S. certification policies in Colombia engendered re-
sentment against U.S. government).
181. See Samper, supra note 95 (explaining that Colombian police agencies disman-
tled drug cartels in early-mid 1990s, allowing politicians to contemplate extradition
measures); Williams & Williams, supra note 18, at 1125-26, 1132 (arguing that U.S. ef-
forts to approach anti-drug enforcement through multilateral conventions in 1980s and
1990s showed respect for Colombian institutions and promoted better relations).
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tionals. 182 Narco-terrorists, with the additional support of vari-
ous guerilla movements, dissuaded extradition through bribery,
violence, or harassment." 3 Furthermore, U.S. anti-drug policies,
including decertification, exacerbated Colombia's traditional
civil law preference to prohibit extradition. 18 4
i. Violence and Corruption
Colombia's efforts to extradite terrorists and drug traffick-
ers were severely restricted by corruption in all branches of the
government 185 and by fear of violent repercussions.186 Narco-
terrorists responded to extradition by murdering or bribing hun-
dreds of law enforcement officers, judges, and political lead-
ers. 87 By the early 1990s, drug barons decimated the rule of law
and controlled both the political and economic facets of Colom-
bian society.188 In 1995, Colombia experienced seventy-six inter-
national terrorist incidents, the highest number in Latin
America.189 Indeed, a 1997 World Bank report ranked Colom-
182. See Nagle, supra note 27, at 865 (explaining that narco-terrorism prevented
implementation of extradition policy in Colombia); Williams & Williams, supra note 18,
at 1129 (explaining that Colombians view extradition as violation of sovereignty); Hear-
ings II, supra note 18 (testimony of Rensselaer W. Lee, Global Advisor) (explaining that
U.S. certification policies are resented in drug producing nations, such as Colombia,
because it places onus of blame on producers rather than consumers).
183. See Michael R. Pahl, Wanted: Criminal Justice-Colombia's Adoption of a
Prosecutorial System of Criminal Procedure, 16 FoRDHAm INT'L L.J. 608, 609 (1993) (stating
that narco-terrorists assassinated dozens of law enforcement officials in 1992).
184. See Sherman, supra note 23, at 669 (explaining that U.S. international drug
control policy erodes Colombian rule of law and fosters resentment among Colombian
populace).
185. See id. (stating that Colombian government officials use drug trafficking for
personal and political advantage); see also Reuters, U.S. Criticizes Colombia Law on Drug
Lords, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1997, at A14 [hereinafter U.S. Criticism] (describing Colom-
bian President Ernesto Samper's affiliation with Cali drug cartel). For example, in the
late 1990s, commentators and officials noted that the strength of President Ernesto
Samper's influence over the Colombian Congress might have reflected his dealings
with the Cali drug cartel. U.S. Criticism, supra, at A14. Samper had been associated with
the Cali drug cartel since revelations surfaced shortly after his election that he received
campaign contributions from the drug organization. Id.
186. Krohne, supra note 32, at 180.
187. Id. For a comprehensive record of the narco-terrorist response to Colombia's
efforts to use extradition as a means of curing its domestic drug problem, see Schuler &
McBride, supra note 18, at 910-11 n.70.
188. See Sherman, supra note 23, at 684-85 (explaining that Colombian narco-ter-
rorism propelled state of seige, increased martial law, and eroded rule of law).
189. See Schuler & McBride, supra note 18, at nn.68-69 (explaining that attempted
murders occurred beyond Colombia's borders). Included in these assassination at-
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bia the most violent country in Latin America. 190 Commentators
agree, therefore, that narco-terrorism created a life-threatening
atmosphere for those seeking to bring drug traffickers to jus-
tice. 1 9
1
As a result of narco-terrorism and corruption, Colombia suf-
fered from one of the world's highest impunity rates. 192 Convic-
tion rates were equally low,193 while an estimated 1,300,000 cases
awaited trial in Colombia's courts.194 Human rights violations
also went relatively unpunished.
95
ii. Narco-Guerillas
Narco-terrorists were not the only challenges facing Colom-
bian anti-drug agencies. Various guerilla movements protected
the farmers who grew coca and the traffickers who processed it
into cocaine.' 96 These leftist militant groups funded themselves
through extortion of farmers and by providing transport of co-
caine and heroin for drug traffickers. 97 They violently de-
tempts was Colombia's Ambassador to Hungary, Enrique Parejo Gonzalez. Id. After
leaving his Budapest home on January 13, 1987, Parejo was shot three times in the head
and twice in the arms, and survived. Id. In fact, there were reports that the Medellin
cartel planned assassinations for U.S. targets, including four DEA agents, one agent's
wife, a prosecutor in Miami, and SterlingJohnson,Jr., New York City's Special Narcotics
Prosecutor in 1988 (presently a federal judge in the Eastern District of New York). Id.
190. See Yadira Ferrer, Colombia-U.S. Extradition Creates Chilly Climate for Samper, I.P.
SERV., Sept. 23, 1997 (reporting that violence in Colombia affects U.S. certification anal-
ysis).
191. Id.; see Pahl, supra note 183, at 609 (stating that in 1992 alone, guerillas and
drug traffickers assassinated approximately 217 police officers).
192. See Pahl, supra note 183, at 609 ("During the past thirty years it is estimated
that only 1.2 to two percent of all crimes reported ended in sentence."). The problem
of impunity stems from skepticism about the criminal justice system, fear of the authori-
ties, or retribution from the accused. Id.
193. See id. (stating that only twenty percent of all crimes committed are reported,
with only four percent resulting in conviction).
194. See id. (citing Gustavo Gallon Giraldo & Rodrigo UprinnyYepes, Constituyente,
violencia, y derecheos humanos, 13 RmEsTo FORo 37, 42 (Oct. 1990)).
195. See id. ("Human rights violations by the military forces-including torture,
disappearances and assassination-often go unpunished as well.").
196. See Hearings III, supra note 20 (testimony of Thomas A. Constantine, DEA
Administrator) (describing role of guerilla movements in Colombian anti-narcotics law
enforcement). Two guerilla movements of notice are the Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia ("FARC") and the National Liberation Army ("ELN"). Id.; see Schemo,
supra note 151, at A14 (stating that Colombian police estimated that 3155 of Colom-
bia's 15,000 guerillas were active in drug trafficking).
197. Hearings III, supra note 20 (testimony of Thomas A. Constantine, DEA Admin-
istrator).
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fended coca and poppy fields as well as the processing laborato-
ries by providing ground fire against Colombian National Police
("CNP") air strikes. 9 " Moreover, guerilla movements have been
known to strike at civilian targets."'q
iii. Violation of Sovereignty
Besides the threat posed by narco-terrorism, any push for
extradition reform competed against Colombia's civil law prefer-
ence against extraditing nationals.2 °° Colombians generally per-
ceived extradition as a violation of their sovereign authority.2 ° '
In Colombia, public referendums repeatedly raised the issue of
extradition.20 2 In 1988, opinion polls in Colombia showed that
two-thirds of all Colombians opposed extradition, regarding it as
a violation of national sovereignty and provocation for more
drug violence.2 °3
Colombian officials especially voiced concern, if not resent-
ment, over U.S. abduction policies. 20 4  The Alvarez-Machain2 15
decision caused official outcry.20 6 Although Colombian com-
mentators recognized that the decision concerned a specific
United States-Mexico treaty,20 7 they feared that the decision
might implicate all international treaties. 218 Colombian officials
198. Id.
199. See Krohne, supra note 32, at 180 (explaining that included in 1995 death toll
were two U.S. missionaries held hostage by FARC since 1994).
200. See Nagle, supra note 27, at 865 (explaining that Colombian politicians were
ideologically opposed to extradition in 1980s.)
201. See Williams & Williams, supra note 18, at 1129 (describing 1988 Colombian
public referendum reflecting two-thirds popular opposition to extradition).
202. Id.; Samper, supra note 95.
203. See Williams & Williams, supra note 18, at 1129 (quoting former Colombian
attorney general as stating, "Nobody wants to see Colombians judged in another coun-
try without knowing the language and without their families. It's like saying our justice
system is not strong enough. I've seen many judges do their job well, if they say there
was not enough evidence we must believe them.").
204. See Zaid, supra note 175, at 847 (reporting Colombian outrage to Alvarez-
Machain).
205. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (holding that forci-
ble abduction of Mexican citizen into United States does not violate U.S.-Mexico Extra-
dition Treaty).
206. See Zaid, supra note 175, at 847 (reporting that Colombian government de-
clared onJune 17, 1992, that it "emphatically rejects the United States Supreme Court
decision in the case United States against Alvarez-Machain").
207. EXTRADITION TREATY, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., T.I.A.S. No. 9656 (1980).
208. See Zaid, supra note 175, at 847 (reporting that Colombian officials stated that
Alvarez-Machain's "substance threatens the legal stability of all public treaties").
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criticized the decision as a violation of sovereignty. 20 9 Particular
concern focused upon the possibility that U.S. law enforcement
might attempt to abduct a Colombian citizen, causing detriment
to the U.S.-Colombian relationship.210
iv. Decertification
Drug certification 21 also engendered animosity, thus weak-
ening the chances for U.S.-backed extradition reform. 212 The
certification program compels other governments to implement
and enforce anti-drug policies.213 It is also designed to promote
cooperation between international law enforcement agencies.214
Many South American nations, including Colombia, however,
perceived decertification as an unfair attack on cocaine produ-
cers while overlooking the role of cocaine consumers.215 Some
commentators felt that the U.S. government misused decertifica-
tion as a political weapon for other U.S. economic and foreign
policy decisions.2 6 Commentators also observed that decertifi-
cation often entailed double standards for different countries in
the Latin American region, thus harming the credibility of the
policy.217 Although by 1998 Colombian officials claimed indif-
ference to decertification, 211 commentators noted the significant
209. See id. (reporting Justice Minister Fernando Carrillo stating that Alvarez-
Machain was inconsistent with "years of struggle for consolidation" of international law
in areas regarding "sovereignty, equality of nation-states, self-determination, and non-
interference").
210. See id. (stating that military officers warned that Alvarez-Machain decision
could serve to justify potential abduction of rebels who have targeted U.S. companies
for sabotage and who have kidnapped U.S. nationals). The Colombian government
added that "if the kidnapping of a Colombian national, in order to proceed to judge
him abroad, would ever take place, the excellent relations that traditionally have been
held among the governments of Colombia and the United States could be seriously
affected." Id.
211. Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2291 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
212. Hearings II, supra note 18 (testimony of Rensselaer W. Lee, Global Advisor).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. See id. (stating that United States consistently grants Mexico full certification
despite common belief among U.S. officials that corruption is widespread at all levels of
Mexican government). Conversely, Iran continually suffers decertification even though
it maintains a vigorous anti-narcotics program. Id.
217. Id.
218. See Tim Golden, In Drug War, America Barks but Fear of Bite Fades, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 1, 1998 at D16 (quoting Colombian Ambassador Juan Carlos Esquerra, who ex-
plained "when we didn't know what it would mean to be certified, we were terribly
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impact of the program upon Colombian domestic policies in the
1990S.219
b. Pro-Extradition Factors
Yet, despite a myriad of obstacles, developments both within
and beyond Colombia's borders operated to create the possibil-
ity of extradition reform. 2 Significantly, Colombian lawmakers
experienced political and ideological change in their view of ex-
tradition.221 Moreover, U.S. anti-drug agencies and officials rec-
ognized that alternative methods to fighting drugs could en-
hance the possibility of extradition reform in Colombia. 222
i. Shifting Ideologies
Major political change in Colombia during the 1990s led to
the birth of a pro-extradition movement.223 In the early part of
the decade, narco-terrorism effectively stymied attempts to cre-
ate extradition reform.224 After a major crackdown on cartel
worried that it would have catastrophic effects .... Once you know the impact, [how-
ever,] you know you can handle it.").
219. Hearings II, supra note 18 (testimony of Rensselaer W. Lee, Global Advisor).
[Diecertification or the threat of it has yielded arrests of all the top leaders of
the Cali cartel; has sustained a far-reaching investigation of corruption within
the Colombian political system; has encouraged the passage of stronger asset-
forfeiture and antimoney laundering laws;... has stimulated more effective
U.S.-Colombian collaboration against maritime drug smuggling; and has rein-
forced Colombian determination to mount a massive aerial spraying campaign
against the country's coca plantations
Id.
220. See Samper, supra note 95 (quoting President Samper as stating that "[t]he
climate in Colombia has changed over the past decade. The climate back then was
marked by terrorism, intimidation and harassment .... I feel that climate has now
changed. The circumstances in Colombia are different now."); Hearings III, supra note
20 (testimony of Thomas A. Constantine, DEA Administrator) (stating that successful
Colombian counter-narcotics efforts in early-mid 1990s commenced process of restor-
ing rule of law); see also Williams & Williams, supra note 18, at 1125-26, 1132 (arguing
that U.S. efforts over last decade to promote law enforcement and prosecutorial coop-
eration will yield better results in war on drugs).
221. See Samper, supra note 95 (quoting Samper's observations that effective Co-
lombian legislative reforms against organized crime in early 1990s created atmosphere
wherein political discussions concerning extradition became possible).
222. See Williams & Williams, supra note 18, at 1125-26, 1132 (arguing that U.S.
participation in international criminal control conventions shows cooperative spirit,
which leads to improved U.S. relations with producer nations).
223. See Samper, supra note 95 (reporting that Samper noted new extradition policy
was result of shifting political climate occurring during course of 1990s).
224. See id. (quoting Samper as stating that terrorism, intimidation, and harass-
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leaders in the mid-to-late 1990s, however, the Colombian polit-
ical and judicial systems gained renewed strength.225 New re-
form-minded politicians and jurists recognized that extradition
might help solve Colombia's drug cartel problem.226
By the late 1990s, many Colombian lawmakers reinterpreted
extradition to be a tool, not a renunciation, of national sover-
eignty.2 27 In this light, their main concern involved Colombia's
high impunity rates.228 Impunity disserved and weakened Co-
lombia by gutting the rule of law and dismantling the civil or-
der.229 These reformers understood that extradition was needed
in tandem with tougher penal sanctions2 ° not only to fight drug
ment compelled "the constituents in 1991 to ban outright the extradition of Colombian
citizens").
225. See id. (reporting that success of this major law enforcement breakthrough
was primarily result of efforts by Colombian National Police "CNP" in 1995 and 1996).
All of the top drug-syndicate leadership in Cali, for example, were imprisoned or killed.
See Hearings III, supra note 20 (testimony of Thomas A. Constantine, DEA Administra-
tor) (explaining that CNP successes resulted from international cooperation between
law enforcement agencies). Such successes included (1) the April 1997 arrest of Julio
Pastor Perafan in Venezuela by Venezuelan authorities, (2) the August 1997 arrest of
Julio Caesar Nasser David, and (3) the September 1997 surrender of Jose Orlando
Henao Montoya. Id. Overall, the CNP in 1997 seized millions of dollars in assets
owned by major drug traffickers, as well as more than 34 metric tons of cocaine HCL,
10 metric tons of cocaine base, 1261 kilograms of heroin/morphine base, 120 kilo-
grams of opium gum, and 136 metric tons of marijuana. Id.
226. See McCaffrey, supra note 173, at 508 (noting that both Colombian and U.S.
officials have recognized need to approach drug-trafficking as international problem,
necessitating close cooperation between both nations); Samper, supra note 95 (quoting
Samper as stating, "Six years ago, no one could even utter the word extradition in this
country; it was taboo. Today, we have overcome this taboo and are demonstrating that
as of this moment, all Colombians who commit a crime abroad will not be able to use
their country as a haven to hide their crimes.").
227. See Senator Claudia Blum, iPor Que Es Importante Revivar La Extradicion En
Colombia? (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) [hereinafter Blum] (argu-
ing that Colombia must enact pro-extradition laws in order to fight drug trafficking).
228. Id.; Samper, supra note 95.
People here talk to much about protecting the rights of criminals. However,
they do not talk about protecting the honour of all the Colombian citizens
who are hurt by the wrongdoing of a few Colombians who continue to commit
crimes abroad and come here looking for protection in the Colombian judi-
cial system to evade their responsibility.
Samper, supra.
229. See Blum, supra note 227 (quoting Colombian Senator Blum as stating, "A
country which conditions the State's actions to the interests of lawbreakers, without
being able to guarantee the enforcement of the law for fear of retaliation, is an incapa-
ble and weak state which is not sovereign, and does not fulfill one of its basic functions
such as preserving order.").
230. See Ferrer, supra note 190 (noting that Colombian criminal reform included
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trafficking, but also to dissuade its re-emergence among the next
231generation.
Further, Colombian reformers rejected the notion that re-
establishing extradition would be a concession to U.S. pres-
sure.23 2 Instead, they focused inward towards their own account-
ability.2 3 These reformers, therefore, recognized the global
trend towards multilateralism in enforcing anti-drug policies.234
Accordingly, they sensed a duty to the greater international com-
munity to strengthen their anti-drug efforts.23 5
ii. U.S. Shifting Ideologies and Multilateral Practices
U.S. officials have realized that it is nearly impossible to lo-
cate and arrest wanted individuals without the assistance of law
enforcement in other countries. 236 Thus, the United States has
slowly increased its dialogue with other nations in an effort to
build harmony in capturing drug traffickers.237 This movement
financing efforts to increase destruction of illegal crops, to strengthen prison system, to
mandate tougher sentences for drug traffickers, and to approve asset-forfeiture laws).
231.
Blum, supra note 227.
232. Id.
233. See id. (quoting Senator Blum as stating, "It is before the entire international
community, before which [Colombia] constitutes a potential and real refuge for law-
breakers, when it decide[s] to prohibit the possibility of extraditing nationals.").
234. See Samper, supra note 95 (quoting President Samper as stating, "Regarding
the international arena, I believe the world is much more aware of the need for ajoint
and multilateral solution to the drug problem and the realization that we all have a
shared responsibility to fight drugs.").
235. See Blum, supra note 227 (quoting Senator Blum as stating that Colombia
owes "the rest of the world a greater commitment in the struggle against organized
crime"). President Samper observed that new extradition reform
responds as well to the international community, because if Colombia had not
come up with the toughest laws or the most effective instruments to fight the
international drug trade, we would not have the moral and political authority
to ask the world to understand that the extradition or drug trafficking
problems are not exclusively Colombian.
Samper, supra note 95.
236. See Hearings III, supra note 20 (testimony of Thomas A. Constantine, DEA
Administrator) (reporting that U.S. law enforcement depends on Colombian agencies,
which are constantly bribed and intimidated by drug cartels, to capture drug traffick-
ers). One commentator remarked that drug cartels depend largely upon their ability to
"intimidate, murder or corrupt public officials and law enforcement officers" to con-
duct their illegal businesses. Id. Accordingly, "[t]hese sophisticated criminal groups
cannot thrive unless law enforcement officials have been paid bribes, and witnesses fear
for their lives." Id.
237. See McCaffrey, supra note 173, at 508 (reporting that in October 1997, Presi-
dent Clinton's drug "czar," General Barry McCaffrey, made three-day visit to Colombia
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towards bilateral cooperation established friendly ties and
showed respect for other nations' sovereignty. 238 Thus, begin-
ning in the late 1980s, as its interdiction techniques were failing,
the United States began to look for alternative methods to fight
its War on Drugs.23 9
For example, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988240 ("Act") in-
cluded provisions that indicated a change in the way that the
United States approached international drug control.24 1 The
Act expressed a need to create multinational conventions in or-
der to develop effective international anti-narcotic programs.242
Specifically, the Act proposed that diplomatic, multinational
in which he praised Colombian anti-narcotics efforts). General McCaffrey seemed to
take a step towards accepting the Colombian military's argument that there is no differ-
ence between "narco-guerillas" and drug traffickers. Id. This distinction is significant
because Congress has stipulated that U.S. aid to Colombia to fight drug trafficking can-
not be used for counter-insurgency operations. Id.; British Drug Supremo Wants Extradi-
tion Law to Apply Retroactively (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Nov. 17, 1997) [here-
inafter British Drug Supremo]. Colombian dialogue has not been limited to the United
States. British Drug Supremo, supra. In November 1997, British Foreign Office of Inter-
national Drugs Coordinator Patrick Nixon visited Colombia to engage in dialogue con-
cerning extradition policy and to review existing bilateral agreements in the context of
anti-drug law enforcement. Id.
238. See Williams & Williams, supra note 18, at 1125-26, 1132 (arguing that U.S.
involvement in Vienna treaty of 1988 established willingness to cooperate with Colom-
bian law enforcement, rather than dictate anti-drug policy).
239. See Jimmy Gurul6, The 1988 U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances-A Ten Year Perspective: Is International Cooperation Merely
Illusory?, 22 FoRDHAM INT'L LJ. 74, 75-76 (1998) (explaining that in order to appre-
hend and prosecute Colombian drug traffickers, U.S. officials have attempted "bold
and innovative counter-narcotics strategies," specifically through multilateral, collabora-
tive law enforcement procedures).
240. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 1001, 102 Star. 4181
(1988). Title IV of the Act at Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 4001, 102 Stat. 4181, 4261 (1988) is
entitled the International Narcotics Control Act of 1988.
241. Id.
242. International Narcotics Control Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 4101, 102
Stat. 4181, 4263 (1988) provides:
It is the sense of Congress that-
(3) to preserve national sovereignty, protect the public health, and maintain
domestic law and order within their borders, member nations of the Organiza-
tion of American States should coordinate their efforts to fight the illegal drug
trade; [and]
(4) recent events in drug source and transit countries in the Western Hemi-
sphere make clear the requirement for international agreement on the forma-
tion of a multinational force to conduct operations against these illegal drug
smuggling organizations.
Id. § 4101.
2410 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 22:2373
mechanisms enforce anti-drug policy.243 Some commentators
noted that with this step, the signatories recognized the interna-
tional scope of both the drug problem as well as its solution.2 "
That same year, the United States joined forty-two other na-
tions in signing the Vienna Treaty in the United Nations Con-
vention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drug and Psychotropic
Substances ("Convention") .245 The parties to the Convention
recognized that international drug trafficking implicates organ-
ized crime as well as legitimate activities, thus threatening na-
tional economic interests. 246 The Convention sought to coordi-
nate multilateral anti-drug efforts by mandating domestic legisla-
tive application of its provisions.247  Simultaneously, the
243. Id. International Narcotics Control Act § 4101 (a) (5) states "the United States
should make every effort to initiate diplomatic discussion through the Organization of
American States aimed at achieving agreement to establish and operate a Western
Hemisphere anti-narcotics force." Id. § 4101 (a) (5). International Narcotics Control
Act § 4101 (a) (5), (b) states:
(b) The President shall direct the United States Ambassador to the Organiza-
tion of American States, under the direction of the Secretary of State, to initi-
ate diplomatic discussions with member nations of the Organization of Ameri-
can States aimed at securing agreement to the formation of a multinational
force to conduct operations against illegal drug smuggling organizations wher-
ever they may be found in the Western Hemisphere.
Id. § 4101(a) (5).
244. See Williams & Williams, supra note 18, at 1125-26 (arguing that effectiveness
of military operations against drug traffickers increases when executed pursuant to mul-
tinational agencies, such as Organization of American States).
245. United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drug and
Psychotropic Substances, U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 82/16, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 493 (1988)
[hereinafter United Nations Convention]. See generally GurulM, supra note 239 (provid-
ing ten-year critical analysis of Convention).
246. See United Nations Convention, supra note 245, at U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 82/16,
at 1-2 (The preamble is not reprinted in I.L.M., but is available in U.N. Doc. E/Conf.
82/15). The preamble of the Convention states:
The Parties to this Convention, ...
Recogniz[e] the links between illicit traffic and other related organized crimi-
nal activity which undermines the legitimate economies and threatens the sta-
bility, security and sovereignty of States,
Recogniz[e] also that illicit traffic is an international criminal activity, the sup-
pression of which demands urgent attention and the highest priority,
Aware that illicit traffic generates large financial profits and wealth enabling
transnational criminal organizations to penetrate, contaminate and corrupt
the structures of government, legitimate commercial and financial business,
and society at all its levels.
Id.
247. Id. art. 2(1), 28 I.L.M. at 500. Article 2(1) of the Convention provides:
The purpose of this Convention is to promote co-operation among the Parties
so that they may address more effectively the various aspects of illicit traffic in
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Convention ensured a mutual respect for the national sover-
eignty of each of its signatories.248
,Other major features of the Convention included the crea-
tion of internationally recognized criminal offenses219 and inter-
national principles governing domestic jurisdiction over ' drug
trafficking and related offenses.25 ° It provided for mutual assist-
ance 251 among the parties in taking statements, 25 2 serving pro-
cess,253 conducting searches and seizures,254 and engaging in
other evidence-gathering activities.2 5 Commentators noted that
U.S. participation in the Convention, therefore, indicated a will-
ingness to work with other countries and international bodies to
establish legal standards for prosecuting and convicting drug
traffickers. 2 6
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances having an international dimen-
sion. In carrying out their obligations under the Convention, the Parties shall
take necessary measures, including legislative and administrative measures, in
conformity with the fundamental provisions of their respective domestic legis-
lative systems.
Id.
248. Id. art. 2(2), (3), 28 I.L.M. at 500. These provisions state that:
2. The Parties shall carry out their obligations under this Convention in a
manner consistent with the principles of sovereign equality and territorial in-
tegrity of States and that of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other
States.
3. A Party shall not undertake in the territory of another Party the exercise of
jurisdiction and performance of functions which are exclusively reserved for
the authorities of that other Party by its domestic law.
Id.
249. See id. art. 3, 28 I.L.M. at 500-03 (listing criminal offenses and sanctions con-
cerning various drug production and distribution techniques).
250. See id. art. 4, 28 I.L.M. at 503-04 (concerning issues such as territoriality, juris-
diction, and nationality).
251. See id. art. 7, 28 I.L.M. at 508 ("The Parties shall afford one another, pursuant
to this article, the widest measure of mutual legal assistance in investigations, prosecu-
tions, and judicial proceedings in relation to criminal offences.").
252. See id. art. 7(2) (a), 28 I.L.M. at 508 ("Mutual legal assistance to be afforded in
accordance with this article may be requested for ... [t]aking evidence or statements
from persons . . ").
253. See id. art. 7(2)(b), 28 I.L.M. at 508 (providing for "service of judicial docu-
ments").
254. See id. art. 7(2) (c), 28 I.L.M. at 508 (providing mutual legal assistance in exe-
cuting searches and seizures).
255. See id. art. 7(2) (e), 28 I.L.M. at 508 (providing mutual legal assistance in sup-
plying information and evidentiary items).
256. See Williams & Williams, supra note 18, at 1132 (arguing that multilateral con-
ventions are superior to unilateral or bilateral efforts in fighting drugs).
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2. Factors Affecting Dominican Extradition Reform
As in Colombia, extradition reform in the Dominican Re-
public encountered several competing interests.25 7 In the 1990s,
multiple forces relating to drug trafficking and anti-drug en-
forcement operated to prevent the development of a pro-extra-
dition policy.258 Nevertheless, during this same period, other
conditions developed that ultimately fostered an extradition
movement.
259
a. Anti-Extradition Factors
Several factors existed in the Dominican Republic that chal-
lenged the formation of extradition reform. 260 For example, Do-
minican drug gangs in the United States maintained ties to their
homeland, bribing and corrupting government officials in order
to ensure political influence. 261  Furthermore, U.S. anti-drug
policies, as well as other specific Caribbean-directed U.S. poli-
cies, caused resentment that impeded extradition reform.262
i. Corruption and Financial Influence
Dominican drug dealers in the United States affected extra-
dition reform by bribing and corrupting Dominican officials.263
Corruption was widespread among Dominican police, military
257. See Rohter & Krauss, supra note 136, at Al (stating that various factors, includ-
ing political corruption and bribery, discouraged extradition reform).
258. See id. (explaining that Dominican drug dealers in United States funneled
money to Dominican politicians in order to buy votes on legislative matters); Fineman
II, supra note 27, at A4 (explaining that Dominicans perceived many U.S. anti-drug and
financial foreign policies as intrusive).
259. See Fineman III, supra note 27, at A5 (explaining that Dominican lawmakers
recognized that removing drug dealers through extradition legitimizes Dominican gov-
ernment in global community).
260. See Wren, supra note 2, at Al (reporting that Dominicans traditionally refused
extradition requests because it violated their sovereign authority); Rohter & Krauss,
supra note 136, at Al (reporting that many Dominican legislators were cousins or broth-
ers of Dominican drug dealers residing in United States); Fineman II, supra note 27, at
A4 (describing Dominican government's anger concerning U.S. foreign policies in
Caribbean that dismissed Dominican financial concerns).
261. See Rohter & Krauss, supra note 136, at Al (reporting that when Dominican
legislature raised issue of extradition, Dominican drug dealers in United States would
bribe Dominican congressmen to vote against extradition).
262. See Fineman II, supra note 27, at A4 (describing U.S. immigration laws that
inundated Dominican Republic with convicts).
263. See Rohter & Krauss, supra note 136, at Al (reporting that Dominican drug
dealers in United States bribed Dominican congressmen to vote against extradition).
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security, and the army's J-2, the military intelligence division,264
during President Joaquin Balaguer's long tenure. 65 Further-
more, judges and prosecutors delayed drug cases, while banks
maintained liberal procedures in order to attract money laun-
derers.2 6 6
As a result, drug traffickers provided a significant monetary
infusion into Dominican society.26 7 The amount of money laun-
dered from the United States through Dominican financial insti-
tutions doubled during 1995-1998 to more than US$1 billion per
annum. 6  Buildings and shopping centers sprouted across the
island nation, and Dominican banks opened branches as far
away as Thailand. 69
ii. Violation of Sovereignty
Additionally, commentators have noted that United States'
Caribbean policies throughout the 1990s provoked resistance. 70
Along with other island nations, the Dominican Republic re-
sponded indignantly to U.S. activity in the Caribbean.27' Specifi-
cally, commentators found that the United States engendered
resentment because it approached Caribbean issues unilater-
ally2 72 and with minimal interest for the financial well-being of
264. See id. (reporting that 80% of luggage supervisors, technicians, and handlers
were on drug trafficker payrolls).
265. See id. (reporting thatJoaquin Balaguer, who originally took office after U.S.
invasion in 1965, ruled Dominican Republic into late 1990s). Rampant voter fraud and
other institutionalized forms of corruption *characterized Balaguer's administration. Id.
266. Id.
267. See id. (reporting that by late 1990s, significant portion of drugs distributed in
eastern United States passed through Dominican Republic).
268. See id. (reporting that much of laundered money is invested in Dominican
real estate, banks, and business). New office buildings, hotels and shopping centers-
often in the style known as "narco-deco"-are prevalent in the major cities. Id.
269. See id. (reporting that new fears grew about growing economic influence of
traffickers). As Marino Vinicio Castillo, the presidential appointee directing the Do-
minican Republic anti-drug program, remarked, "There is a process of Colombianiza-
tion going on. It is a very serious threat .... The Colombians may not have been able
to detect it happening there, but here we can see the narcotics traffickers covertly infil-
trating the banking system, political parties and the media." Id.
270. See generally Fineman II, supra note 27, at A4.
271. See id. (reporting that Dominican Republic resisted apparent U.S. post-Soviet
insensitivity).
272. See id. (reporting that Anibal de Castro, noted Dominican commentator, ob-
served, "The agenda for the United States with the nations of the Caribbean appears to
be more unilateral than bilateral. More often than not, it's a one-way ticket.").
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the region's nations.273 In response, the Dominican Republic re-
fused to capitulate to U.S. extradition requests.274
Some commentators offered that this U.S. unilateralism was
the result of a major shift in international power in the wake of
the Cold War.2 75 During the Cold War, U.S. concerns included
the fear that a Moscow-backed Cuba or Nicaragua would export
communism to the Caribbean. 276 The United States thus took
extra measures to develop friendly ties with the nations of the
region.2 7 7 Accordingly, U.S. economic aid in the direct form of
financial assistance and indirectly through the protection of
favorable trade status in Europe and elsewhere ensured a strong
hegemonic influence in the Caribbean. 278 With the collapse of
the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s, however, the United
States shifted its policy.279 The United States' neighbors to the
south felt the impact.280
A well-known example concerned New York City Police
Commissioner Howard Safir's 1996 visit to Dominican President
273. See id. (reporting that U.S. efforts to obtain World Trade Organization ruling
hurt Caribbean banana industry).
274. See id. (reporting that Dominican government contested U.S. immigration
laws that flooded Dominican Republic with criminals sent back after serving minimal
sentences in U.S. prisons). In 1997, the Dominican Department of Foreign Relations
reported that the United States deported 1925 Dominicans who had served incomplete
sentences. Id. As Dominican Minister of Foreign Relations Eduardo Latorre remarked,
"If one appeals to the universality of crime, then it cannot be alleged that Dominicans
who have committed crimes in the United States should be sent to the Dominican Re-
public." Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. See id. (reporting that former Barbadaon foreign minister and current Parlia-
ment member remarked, "When there was a Soviet alternative, the United States had to
operate with a lot of finesse.").
278. Id.
279. See id. (describing U.S. World Trade Organization victory that impacted local
Caribbean economies). An example of this shift occurred in 1997, when the United
States won a World Trade Organization ruling that abolished the Caribbean's once
preferred banana export dealings with Europe. Id. In the absence of Soviet competi-
tion, U.S. interests in its own banana industries superceded concerns for the Carib-
bean's economic vitality. Id. As a result, the United States' effort to obtain this ruling
ripped deeply into the economies of many Caribbean nations. Id.
280. See id. (stating that "nowhere else is the David-and-Goliath image as sharply
etched as in the Caribbean, where a handful of nations, among the world's tiniest, have
to live intimately close to the giant in its shadow"). Even in Europe, the United States'
oldest and closest allies viewed the United States as "unpredictable, detached and self-
absorbed." Id.
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Lionel Fernandez.281 Safir sought to discuss the explosion of
drug-related violent crime in the Washington Heights section of
Manhattan, 282 where the vast majority of the city's 500,000 Do-
minican immigrants reside.283  With the police presence in
Washington Heights growing, increasing numbers of Dominican
traffickers escaped New York and found refuge in the Domini-
can Republic. 28 4 Safir presented the Dominican authorities with
a list of dozens of fugitive drug traffickers along with an appeal
for assistance in their capture and return.285 In addition, he also
announced a plan to open a small, permanent New York City
Police Department ("NYPD") office in Santo Domingo.286 The
office would assist Dominican law enforcement officials in cap-
turing wanted individuals,287 while Dominican authorities would
send their own agents to New York to cooperate with the
NYPD.288
The Dominican government did not respond warmly to
Commissioner Safir s9 President Fernandez described Safir's in-
tention of opening a permanent police station in Santo Dom-
ingo as absurd and totally impossible. 9° Other top government
officials even expressed reservations about the proposed change
281. Clifford Krauss, Safir Taking Drug War on the Road, Seeks Help, N.Y. TrMES, Nov.
5, 1996, at B3. Safir was not new to the diplomacy and extradition game. Id. As a
senior official in the U.S. Marshal Service, he helped plan the 1982 capture of Edwin P.
Wilson, a former CIA agent who turned against the agency and sought refuge in Beirut,
Libya. Id. Wilson was lured from Beirut to the Dominican Republic and then was
brought over to the United States. Id. In 1988, Safir persuaded the Dominican Repub-
lic to deportJuan Ramon Matta Ballestros, a Honduran drug trafficker, to Puerto Rico,
where he was arrested. Id.
282. See id. (reporting that Washington Heights has also been dubbed "wholesale
crack center for the Northeast").
283. See Patrice O'Shaughnessy, Safir Plan Irks Dominicans, DAILY NEws, Dec. 15,
1996, at 13 (reporting that Safir sought extradition of approximately 150 Dominicans).
284. Id.
285. See id. (quoting Safir as stating that "Right now, murderers are allowed to go
free. The purpose of this trip is to fix that.").
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. See id. (reporting that Safir cautioned that more negotiations were necessary
between New York City Police Department, Dominican officials, and U.S. State Depart-
ment to determine scope and function of office).
289. See Larry Rohter, Dominican Leader Draws Line on Plan to Help New York in Drug
War, N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 23, 1996, at A2 (reporting that President Fernandez announced
limits to how closely Dominican government would cooperate with New York City po-
lice in tracking down drug suspects).
290. Id.
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to Dominican law to allow the extradition of Dominican nation-
als.291 Most officials raised the issue of sovereignty, observing
that the NYPD does not have the authority of a Dominican insti-
tution to arrest individuals within the Dominican Republic. 92
b. Pro-Extradition Factors
Yet, in spite of the obstacles to extradition reform, other Do-
minican developments kept the possibility of change in extradi-
tion policy alive.293 Importantly, Dominican lawmakers under-
stood that modern anti-drug enforcement required a reconcep-
tualiztion of sovereignty that would accommodate the
extradition of nationals. 94 Meanwhile, for completely different
purposes, President Fernandez utilized extradition as a platform
295 thfor garnering political power. Last, the United States recog-
nized that cooperation, rather than competition, would be a
more effective technique in order to produce extradition poli-
cies favorable to U.S. anti-drug enforcement.296
i. Shifting Ideologies
As in Colombia, Dominican officials began to recognize the
importance of extradition in attacking the drug problem.2 97 Sig-
nificantly, Dominican lawmakers acknowledged that the threat
291. Id.
292. See id. (reporting that Dominican statesman noted that "the New York police
are a local police .... They can't even go into NewJersey, so how are they going to go
to another country, a foreign country? The whole thing is absurd."); see
O'Shaughnessy, supra note 283, at 13 (reporting that another Dominican commentator
noted, "To plant in another country a police unit is just not consistent with what an
independent state should be.").
293. See Fineman III, supra note 27, at A5 (describing how Dominicans redefined
their concept of sovereignty to include extradition of nationals); Rohter & Krauss, supra
note 136, at Al (explaining that President Fernandez lobbied for extradition reform);
Fineman II, supra note 27, at A4 (reporting that U.S. officials recognized that coopera-
tion is effective means of showing support for Dominican policies and, thus, of gaining
Dominican favor).
294. See Fineman III, supra note 27, at A5 (reporting that Dominican congressmen
acknowledged that extradition enforces rule of law and thus reinforces sovereign au-
thority of Dominican government to regulate itself).
295. See Rohter & Krauss, supra note 136, at Al (noting how President Fernandez
supported extradition procedures that served to remove drug dealers that support his
political opponents).
296. See Fineman II, supra note 27, at A4 (noting that President Clinton's presence
at 1997 summit in Barbados exemplified U.S. shift in Caribbean from insensitive to
friendly and cooperative).
297. See Rohter & Krauss, supra note 136, at Al (quoting Dominican official as
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posed by organized drug trafficking surpassed traditional no-
tions of sovereignty. 298 Dominicans understood extradition to
be a safeguard, not a dilution, of sovereign authority. 299 Further-
more, Dominicans also recognized that the victims in a signifi-
cant number of pending cases are themselves Dominican mem-
bers of a U.S. immigrant community. 30 Dominican officials
thus realized that a favorable extradition policy is necessary to
hold accountable the criminals responsible for victimizing Do-
minican citizens abroad.0 1
ii. Political Agenda
Simultaneously, commentators observed that a shifting
political landscape in the late 1990s propelled the issue of extra-
dition into the Dominican political spotlight.30 2 After a come-
from-behind victory in a run-off vote, Lionel Fernandez suc-
ceeded Balaguer on August 16, 1996, promising change and less
corruption. 03 Fernandez's party, however, was weakly repre-
sented in Congress, only controlling less than a tenth of the
seats.3 0 4
Arguably, Fernandez's only option in order to remain politi-
cally viable was to do away with the system supporting his polit-
ical adversaries. 3 0 His survival therefore hinged on removing
the corruption supported by drug traffickers.30 6 Fernandez thus
expressed support for tougher money laundering legislation
and, more importantly, supported the creation of extradition re-
stating, "The only thing the cartels fear is extradition. That is the most powerful tool in
the hands of both governments.").
298. Fineman II, supra note 27, at A4.
299. See Fineman III, supra note 27, at A5 (quoting member of Dominican Cham-
ber of Deputies as stating, "The law reflects a new concept of nationalism within our
Congress and our society, a realization that international organized crime, like the drug
trade, is the gravest threat to all nations' sovereignty."). Another political analyst re-
marked that "this law represents a recognition by our society that drug trafficking is, in
fact, a real problem for us and that extradition is one of the most effective methods of
combatting it." Id.
300. See id. (finding that one. Dominican lawmaker noted this discrepancy, re-
marking, "To have the authority to ask the American government to protect our citi-
zens living there, we have to collaborate with them over here.").
301. Id.
302. Rohter & Krauss, supra note 136, at Al.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
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form along with streamlined extradition procedures. 0 7 Fernan-
dez therefore effectively promoted extradition as a means to
consolidate his own political power.3"8
iii. U.S. Shifting Ideologies and Multilateral Practices
U.S. alternative foreign policies in the Caribbean also went
far in healing Dominican wounds and promoted cooperative law
enforcement mechanisms, such as extradition.0 9 Most recently,
President Clinton attended a summit in Barbados in 1997 to lis-
ten to Caribbean concerns. 310  As result of this summit, the
United States claimed a new sensitivity to the needs of its island
neighbors. 11 U.S. officials recognized the need to engage in di-
alogue directed at establishing bilateral and multilateral cooper-
ation.3 1 2 Significantly, awareness grew that dictating policy is
simply an inefficient means of effecting extradition reform.31 3
II. THE LEGAL SHIFT IN EXTRADITION POLICY IN
COLOMBIA AMD THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
Numerous factors have both challenged and promoted the
creation of laws that provide for the extradition of nationals in
Colombia and the Dominican Republic. 14 Significantly, in 1997
307. See id. (reporting that trafficking groups in Dominican Republic and United
States responded by funneling money into campaigns of candidates that they believed
would vote against Fernandez's reform proposals). Indeed, some commentators ex-
pressed concern that many of the candidates were relatives of suspected drug traffick-
ers. Id.
308. Id.
309. See Fineman II, supra note 27, at A4 (noting U.S. official's belief that coopera-
tion and dialogue promotes better relations in Caribbean).
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. See id. (quoting U.S. diplomat stating that "there has been a real change in
United States attitude since the President's visit [to the Barbados summit]. One of the
most important things that's emerging is we're engaging in a dialogue with these coun-
tries.").
313. See id. (noting that one U.S. official remarked, "There's a new awareness that
we need to work in genuine cooperation and not dictat[e] our policy.").
314. See Smith, supra note 14, at 38 ("The Dominican Republic has for years rebuf-
fed as intrusive U.S. efforts to extradite dozens of fugitives hiding in the Caribbean
nation."); Fineman, supra note 24, at A10 (reporting frustration of U.S. officials who
seek extradition of Dominican nationals). See generally Krohne, supra note 32, at 159
(describing failure to extradite Colombian nationals as result of Colombian internal
violence and degradation of rule of law); Matorin, supra note 32, at 907 (describing
general ineffectiveness of extradition treaties with countries involved in narcotics
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and 1998, both nations changed their extradition policies.315
Commentators have reacted variously to the new reforms.316
A. Colombia's New Extradition Law and Reactions
In general, Colombia has not reciprocated U.S. efforts to
combat drug trafficking.317 This lack of cooperation has ad-
versely impacted the extradition relationship between the two
nations. 3 8  Nevertheless, Colombia did change its extradition
law in 1997. 119 The passage of Acto Legislativo Numero 01 de
1997 (diciembre 16) ("Colombian Law") caused various reac-
tions.32 °
1. The New Colombian Extradition Law
U.S. officials hailed the Colombian Law, allowing for the ex-
tradition of nationals, as a breakthrough .in fighting the War on
Drugs.321 The Colombian Law modifies322 Article 35 of the 1991
trade); Sherman, supra note 23, at 698 (describing failure to extradite Colombian na-
tionals due to lack of rule of law in Colombia).
315. See Acro LEGISLATIVO NUMERO 01 DE 1997 (diciembre 16, 1997) (Colom.)
("Ademhs, la extradici6n de los colombianos por nacimiento se concederi por delitos
cometidos en el exterior, con siderados come tales en le legislaci6n penal colombi-
ana"); LEY 278-98 DEL 29 DE JULIO DE 1998, que modifica los Articulos 4, 5, 8 y 17 y
agrega los Articulos 35 y 36 (Dom. Rep.) ("El Poder Ejecutivo es competente para con-
ceder la extradicci6n de un dominicano en los casos en que exista Convenio de Extradi-
ci6n entre el Estado requeriente y el Estado Dominico").
316. See U.S. Criticism, supra note 185, at A14 (reporting that drug cartels influ-
enced form of Colombian extradition reform through bribery); U.S. Calls on Colombia to
Broaden Extradition Measure, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Nov. 26, 1997 (noting U.S. official's
regret that Colombian extradition reform included non-retroactivity provision). But see
Samper, supra note 95 (describing passage of Colombian extradition reform as success).
317. See Sherman, supra note 23, at 665-70 (describing tension between U.S. anti-
drug policies and Colombian responses).
318. Id.
319. Acro LEGISATivo NUMERO 01 DE 1997 (diciembre 16, 1997) (Colom.).
320. See Samper, supra note 95 (arguing that passage of extradition reform legiti-
mizes Colombia in global community); Weekly Media Availability with Attorney Ceneral Ja-
net Reno, Justice Department, Washington, D.C., FEDERAL NEWS SERV., Oct. 8, 1998 [herein-
after Reno] (reporting that U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno considered Colombian
extradition reform to be positive step despite non-retroactivity provision). But see U.S.
Criticism, supra note 185, at A14 (reporting Colombian commentator's belief that new
extradition law reflects drug cartels' influence over Colombian lawmakers).
321. Reno, supra note 320.
322. See Acro LEGISLATiVO NUMERO'01 DE 1997 ("[P]or medio del cual se modifica
el articulo 35 de la Constituci6n Politica").
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Colombian Constitution3 2' by providing for the extradition of
Colombian nationals,3 24 although it retains the principle of dis-
cretion . 25  The Colombian Law also establishes a political of-
fense exception.32 6 In general, the Colombian Law includes pro-
cedural and substantive guarantees to ensure that Colombian
nationals will not receive treatment in the foreign locale harsher
than what they would receive in Colombia.327
Importantly, the new extradition law does not apply retroac-
tively,3 2' despite numerous U.S. lobbying attempts to effect the
same. 329  Thus, the majority of Colombian drug traffickers
wanted on charges in the United States are exempt from the new
law.3 3 ' These individuals therefore will be incarcerated for far
shorter periods than they would in U.S. prisons due to the na-
ture of Colombian sentencing guidelines.331
2. Reactions to Colombia's New Extradition Law
Commentators noted that the new extradition law's provi-
sions reflect months of drug cartel lobbying, bribery, and death
threats.332 They observed that watered-down provisions weak-
323. See CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE COLOMBIA tit. I, art. 35 (1991) ("Se prohibe la
extradici6n colombianos por nacimiente").
324. See Acro LEGiSLATtVO NUMERO 01 DE 1997 art. 1 ("Ademds, la extradici6n de
los colombianos por nacimiento se concederd por delitos cometidos en el exterior").
325. See id. (stating that "considerados como tales en la legislaci6n penal colombi-
ana. La Ley reglamentari la materia"); Samper, supra note 95 (describing procedural
aspects of Colombian extradition reform). The discretion provision allows the Colom-
bian government the right to grant or deny the extradition of its nationals. Samper,
supra.
326. See Acro LEGISLATIVO NUMERO 01 DE 1997, art. 1 ("La extradici6n no
procederA por delitos politicos").
327. See Samper, supra note 95 (explaining that procedure delineated in Colom-
bian extradition law provides guarantees that Colombians will not be extradited to na-
tions that have less due process than in Colombia).
328. See Acro LEGIsLA-nVo NUMERO 01 DE 1997 art. 1 ("No procederi la extradi-
ci6n cuando se trate de hechos cometidos con anteriordad a la promulagaci6n de la
presente norma").
329. McCafftey, supra note 173, at 508; U.S. Criticism, supra note 185, at A14;
Reuters, Colombia Senate Passes Bill on Drug Extradition, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1997, at A5
[hereinafter Colombia Senate]; Steven Ambrus, Colombia OKs Weak Extradition Law; Latin
America: Critics Note that Jailed Cali Drug Cartel Leaders Will Remain Safe from Prosecution in
US. Legitimate Businesses Fear Expensive Sanctions, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1997, at A4.
330. Ambrus, supra note 329, at A4.
331. Id.
332. See US. Criticism, supra note 185, atA14 (reporting Colombian commentator's
opinion that "[t] he law was passed in this form because of the government's lack of real
will. It is now paying off its debt" to the Cali cartel for financing the campaign).
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ened the 1997 law. 33 As mentioned earlier, the law only applies
to future cases, effectively protecting the hordes of drug cartel
kingpins responsible for drug trafficking throughout the
1990s. 33 4 Interestingly, individuals who surrender to Colombian
authorities are not extraditable.3 35
U.S. officials expressed regret over the non-retroactivity of
the new law."3 6 They feared that the lack of such a provision
would severely undermine the efforts of anti-drug agencies
within Colombia.3 1 7  U.S. officials thus called on President
Samper and the Colombian Congress to alter the form of the law
to include retroactivity. 338 Many commentators speculated on
how the new law would impact the U.S. certification process.3 39
Colombian lawmakers even questioned the constitutionality of
the law,3 4 ° and one official proposed holding a national referen-
dum on the issue of extradition.3 41
For the most part, President Samper responded posi-
tively.3 14 2 Although he admitted defeat concerning the non-ret-
roactivity provision,34 3 he praised the new law as a crucial step in
333. Colombia Senate, supra note 329, at A5; Ambrus, supra note 329, at A4; U.S.
Criticism, supra note 185, at A14.
334. U.S. Criticism, supra note 185, at A14. Indeed, as of the date of this publica-
tion, no Colombians have been extradited since 1991, despite the existence of the new
law for more than 16 months. Adam Thomson, Reno Presses Case for Colombian Extradi-
tions, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1999, at 5. U.S. officials blame the non-retroactivity provision
of the new law for the inability to extradite wanted drug traffickers. Thomson, supra, at
5.
335. Colombia Senate, supra note 329, at A5.
336. See Calls on Colombia, supra note 316 (reporting that U.S. official remarked
that it was "regrettable that the Colombian Congress failed to pass an unrestricted
bill").
337. See id. (quoting U.S. official as stating, "The Congress' decision to prohibit
retroactivity is a setback for all of those in Colombia who are fighting at great personal
risk against the drug trade and drug-related corruption.").
338. See id. (quoting U.S. official as stating that "[w]e call on President Samper
and the Colombian Congress to reinstate a provision on retroactivity and not allow
further undercutting of the bill.").
339. Samper, supra note 95.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. See id. (quoting Samper's description of extradition reform as success because
it prevents drug traffickers from manipulating Colombian justice system).
343. See id. (reporting that Samper admitted that his administration "would have
wanted [the extradition bill] to be passed without any restrictions. Unfortunately, I
must admit defeat in that regard."). Samper insisted, however, that "it was an
honourable defeat." Id.
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fighting drug cartels. 4  He dismissed the notion that the new
extradition law represented victory for the Colombian drug car-
tels, emphasizing that most cartel members already were incar-
cerated and facing long prison terms.345 He further asserted
that these cartel members were immune from extradition until
they completed serving their prison terms.3 46 Last, he opposed
efforts to create a national referendum on extradition, predict-
ing that any such measure would expose the citizenry to violent
narco-terrorist intimidation.347
B. The Dominican Republic's New Extradition Law and Reactions
The Dominican Republic faced numerous impediments to
creating an extradition-friendly law.148 Yet, in 1998, the Domini-
344. See id. (reporting that Samper claimed that passage of bill proved his adminis-
tration's commitment to fighting organized crime). Samper proclaimed that the extra-
dition vote was a victory "not only for the government, but for Colombia." Id. Speaking
at a news conference at Narino Palace on November 26, 1997, Samper announced that
Colombia can now press the international community into committing itself
more seriously to the drug fight. All Colombian citizens who commit crimes
in another country are forewarned that, starting today, they will not be allowed
... to tarnish the image of Colombia, much less use the Colombian justice
system as a shield of impunity to protect themselves from paying for their
crimes. In conclusion, my administration is committed to continuing the fight
against organized crime. Yesterday's reinstatement of extradition is yet an-
other instrument to be used in that fight.
Id.
345. Id. At the news conference at Narino Place, President Samper also stated,
That interpretation like many others we have heard is a disparaging one since
everyone knows that many of the members of the Cali Cartel have already
been tried and given sentences of over 20 years .... In other words, no one
can say that this decision will benefit a specific group because if they refer to
the members of the Cali cartel, there is no way they can be extradited before
they complete their sentences. As far as I understand, not only do these
sentences exceed 20 years, but there are also other proceedings against them
under way.
Id.
346. Id.
347. Id. President Samper noted,
I do not support [a national referendum] because it would expose the nation
to another year of bloody incidents. Some groups interested in causing public
disturbances would not hesitate for a moment to use such a delicate issue to
coerce Colombians into voting as they deem fit. Considering the current at-
mosphere of violence in the country, we could not freely summon Colombians
to decide on such a complex issue without subjecting them to terrorist threats,
which I repeat would turn the referendum into a bloodshed.
Id.
348. See Wren, supra note 2, at Al (noting Dominican refusal to extradite nationals
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can Republic reversed its policy and created Ley 28 278-98 del 29
de julio de 1998 ("Dominican Law"), which allows for the extra-
dition of nationals. 49 The new law led to various reactions.350
1. The New Dominican Extradition. Law
The Dominican Law authorizes the extradition of nationals
for a host of charges, 3 51 including murder,35 2 kidnapping,353 sex-
ual abuse of minors,354 as well as other offenses. Importantly,
the law specifies that trafficking drugs or controlled substances is
an extraditable offense, whether or not a treaty exists between
the Dominican Republic and the requesting nation.3 5 Addition-
ally, persons extradited can only be sentenced up to thirty years
in the requesting nation,356 the maximum sentence in the Do-
minican Republic.357
based on concept of sovereignty); Rohter & Krauss, supra note 136, at Al (discussing
Dominican refusal to extradite nationals due to drug dealers' corruptive influence);
Fineman II, supra note 27, at A4 (noting Dominican refusal to extradite nationals as
rebuke against U.S. insensitivity).
349. See LEY 278-98 DEL 29 DEJULIO DE 1998, que modifica los Articulos 4, 5, 8 y 17
y agrega los Articulos 35 y 36 (Dom. Rep.) ("El Poder Ejecutivo es competente para
conceder la extradicci6n de un dominicano").
350. See Extradition Bill (visited Apr. 6, 1999) <http://www.drl.com> (on file with
the Fordham International Law Journal) [hereinafter Extradition Bill] (reporting that Do-
minican commentators were pleased with Dominican extradition reform); Rohter &
Krauss, supra note 136, at Al, (noting that extradition reform reflects President Fernan-
dez's efforts to consolidate political power).
351. See LEY 278-98 DEL 29 DEJULIo DE 1998, que modifica los Articulos 4, 5, 8 y 17
y agrega los Articulos 35 y 36, art. 4. This statute states:
El Poder Ejecutivo es competente para conceder la extradicci6n de un domin-
icano en los casos en ques exista Convenio de Extradici6n entre el Estado
requeriente y el Estado Dominicano donde quede consignado el principio de
reciprocidad y cuando la solicitud del Estado requeriente se refiere a:
<<Trfifico ilicito de drogas y sustancias controladas y el lavado de bienes
provientes de esta actividad, asesinato, secuestro, estrupo, sustracci6n o seduc-
ci6n de menores de quince (15) afios, comercio carnal o proxenestimo, robo
con violencia, falsifacti6n de monedas, estafas, delitos relativos al trfico de
objetos hist6ricos y arqueol6gico y la pirateria Aerea.>>
Id.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. See id. ("En los convenios de extradicci6n suscritos por el Estado Dominicano
con otros estados, cuando se conceda la extradicci6n de un nacional, no se le aplicari
una pena mayor a la mAxima establecida en el pais, que al momento de la aplicacion de
esta Ley, es de treinta (30) afios.").
357. Extradition Bill, supra note 350.
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The law establishes a political offense exception 358 and de-
fines and enumerates other non-extraditable exceptions." 9 Fur-
ther, the law incorporates dual criminality, 6 ' a resolution of the
accused in the requesting nation,3 61 and the specialty doc-
trine. 362 Finally, provisions dictate the procedural requirements
for both sending 63 and receiving 64 extradition requests.
358. See LEY 278-98 DEL 29 DEJULIO DE 1998, que modifica los Articulos 4, 5, 8 y 17
y agrega los Articulos 35 y 36, art. 5 ("La extradici6n de un extranjero no podr-d con-
cederse, en los siguientes casos: a) Por delitos politicos conforme lo define la Ley 5007,
del 1911, que modifica el C6digo Penal Dominicano").
359. Id. Non-extraditable exceptions include:
Por hechos que no estn calificados como intracciones sancionadas por la
ley penal dominicana;
Por infracciones exclusivamente militares;
Por acogerse al derecho de asilo politico;
Cuando la infracci6n fuera contra la religi6n o constituyera crimen o
delito de opini6n;
Cuando la acci6n pfiblica esti prescripta de acuerdo con la ley del pais
requeriente o en la legislaci6n dominicana.
Cuando la infracci6n estA sancionada en la legislaci6n del pals requeriente
o en la legislaci6n dominicana, con pena menor de un afio de pris6n.
Cuando el Estado requeriente no tiene competencia parajuzgar el hecho
que se le imputa.
Cuando la persona cuya extradici6n se solicita, esti cumpliendo
condena por un hecho de la misma naturaleza o mayor gravedad al que
sirve de fundamento al requerimiento.
Id.
360. Id. art. 17. Article 17 provides:
Que el hecho a que se refiere la demanda esti comprendido dentro de
la enumeraci6n del articulo 4 de esta ley, y que esti sancionado, tanto
en la legislaci6n del pals requeriente como en la legislaci6n dominicana,
asi como no caer dentro de las excepciones que establece la presente
ley.
Que el hecho est6 sancionado con mi.s de un afio de prisi6n tanto en la
legislaci6n del pais requeriente como en la legislaci6n dominicana.
Id.
361. See id. ("Que la acci6n no haya prescrito o caducado, ni al ampaco de la legis-
laci6n del pais requeriente, ni conforme a la legislaci6n dominicana").
362. See id. art. 27 ("El Poder Ejecutivo al conceder la extradici6n deber con-
signar en el Decreto una disposici6n expresa que sujete los efectos de ]a extradici6n a la
condici6n de que el Estado requeriente se compromele de no hacer juzgar al ex-
traditado por una infracci6n diferente a la que motiv6 la extradici6n.").
363. Id. arts. 9-13.
364. Id. arts. 14-16.
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2. Reactions to the Dominican Republic's New
Extradition Law
United States officials expressed reserved hope over the new
Dominican Law. 6' Some commentators considered the law re-
strictive because it did not apply retroactively. 66 The law's provi-
sion that persons extradited can only be sentenced up to thirty
years has important implications as long as capital punishment
remains within the federal sentencing guidelines.367 Thus, Do-
minican officials will comply with U.S. extradition requests on
the condition that the death penalty remains inapplicable.368
III. THE COLOMBIAN EXTRADITION LAW REFLECTS THE
COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT'S INTEREST IN CONTROLLING
ITS OWN ANTI-DRUG POLICY, WHILE THE DOMINICAN
EXTRADITION LAW ENABLES PRESIDENT FERNANDEZ TO
ENHANCE HIS POLITICAL POWER
Although both extradition laws contain provisions that man-
ifest various internal, and to some extent, external pressures, the
substance of the reforms reveal deeper, more purposeful agen-
das. In Colombia, the structure of the reform-especially the
non-retroactivity provision-reveals the Colombian govern-
ment's intention to restrict U.S. anti-drug agencies, while simul-
taneously appearing to promote bilateral cooperation. The Do-
minican extradition law was the result of President Fernandez's
efforts to consolidate his own political power base. As a result,
the ulterior motives predicating these new laws may severely hin-
der their ability to aid U.S. anti-drug law enforcement agencies.
A. The Colombian Extradition Reform Reflects the Colombian
Government's Desire to Restrict the United States' Ability to
Apprehend Colombian Citizens
The structure of the new Colombian extradition law reflects
a conflicted political atmosphere. A progressive Colombian gov-
365. See Greg B. Smith, Dominicans Eye Change in Extradition Targeting Drug Dealers,
DAILY NEWS, July 20, 1998, at 16 (noting that U.S. officials held reservations concerning
effectiveness of Dominican extradition reform).
366. See id. (stating that four hundred Dominicans will evade arrest because of
Dominican laws' non-retroactivity).
367. Extradition Bill, supra note 350.
368. Smith, supra note 14, at 38.
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ernment sought to consolidate power through the removal of
corruption, violence, and drug money from its political sys-
tem. 69 It seized upon extradition as the vehicle for achieving
this goal. At the same time, however, the Colombian govern-
ment did not wish to dilute the potency of its sovereignty, espe-
cially with the United States nearby, ready to pounce on Colom-
bian drug dealers. Thus, the extradition law included a non-ret-
roactivity provision in order to ensure that U.S. anti-drug law
enforcement and policies remained at arm's length.37 °
The form of the new law reflects these motivations. The Co-
lombian Law allows for the extradition of nationals for crimes
committed abroad.37' This provision necessarily includes drug
trafficking offenses because of the international scope3 72 of Co-
lombia's drug cartel operations. Therefore, by passing the law in
this form, the Colombian government put to rest the idea that
sovereignty limits participation in transnational law enforce-
ment.
3 73
Nonetheless, although the Colombian extradition law ap-
pears to exemplify the new attitude adopted by many Colombian
legislators, the truth is that the Colombian Law's non-retroactiv-
ity provision3 74 restricts U.S anti-drug efforts by limiting the
power of U.S. agencies to apprehend Colombian citizens.3
75
The non-retroactivity provision smacks of anti-U.S. sentiment3 76
and plays on the strong nationalism inherent in Colombian soci-
369. See supra notes 219-31 and accompanying text (describing growing consensus
among Colombian politicians that extradition is necessary to defend rule of law from
corruptive influence of drug lords).
370. See Acro LEGISLATIVO NUMERO 01 DE 1997 (diciembre 16, 1997), art. 1 ("No
proceder-A la extradici6n cuando se trate de hechos cometidos con anteriordad a la
promulgaci6n de la preseite norma").
371. See AcTo LEG SIATrvo NUMERO 01 DE 1997 ("Ademis, la extradici6n de los
colombianos por nacimiento se concederd por delitos cometidos en el exterior").
372. See supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text (explaining that scope of Co-
lombian drug cartel operations extends nearly across globe).
373. See supra note 230 and accompanying text (noting Colombian senator's belief
that international extradition is modern expression of sovereign authority in increas-
ingly transnational global community).
374. See Acro LEGIsLATrvo NUMERO 01 DE 1997, art. 1 ("No proceder-S la extradi-
ci6n cuando se trate de hechos cometidos con anteriordad a la promulgaci6n de la
presente norma").
375. See supra note 332 and accompanying text (describing that Colombians have
yet to be extradited under new law).
376. See supra notes 200-15 and accompanying text (explaining that U.S. abduction
and decertification policies caused animosity among Colombian populace).
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ety.3 77 More significantly, this provision bolsters the Colombian
government's ability to assume authority over the execution of
its internal anti-drug policy because U.S. prosecutors will not be
able to dictate who in Colombia should be removed from the
nation.
B. The Dominican Extradition Reform Was Enacted in Order for
President Fernandez to Enhance His Political Power
In the Dominican Republic, the structure of the reform also
reveals mixed motives. The substantive provisions of the law re-
flect awareness among Dominican legislators that drug control is
a serious matter, necessitating more evolved definitions of sover-
eignty.3 7 Thus, the law specifically targets drug trafficking and
drug-related offenses.3 7 9 More importantly, however, the lan-
guage of the statute reflects President Fernandez's attempt to
garner political power and to assert control over the Dominican
political system. 380 Accordingly, the text of the new extradition
law affords wide discretion to the President to decide whether to
extradite Dominican drug dealers. 81
By 1998, the Dominican extradition treaty with the United
States was over eighty-five years old and devoid of language con-
cerning drug offenses.38 2 The Dominican Congress also enacted
the 1969 law prohibiting the extradition of nationals without
transnational drug trafficking in mind.38 3 Meanwhile, Domini-
can lawmakers in the 1990s witnessed an explosion of drug re-
lated activity concerning their nation or involving Dominican na-
377. See supra notes 197-99 and accompanying text (noting that Colombian society
is historically predisposed against extradition).
378. See supra notes 295-99 and accompanying text (explaining that Dominican
legislators viewed extradition as powerful expression of sovereignty).
379. See LEY 278-98 DEL 29 DEJULIO DE 1998, que modica los Articulos 4, 5, 8 y 17 y
agrega los Articulos 35 y 36, art. 4 (Dom. Rep) ("El Poder Ejecutivo es competente para
conceder la extradicci6n de un dominicano . . . [para] [t]rffico ilicito de drogas y
sustancias controladas").
380. See supra notes 300-06 and accompanying text (noting that extradition reform
was motivated by President Lionel Fernandez's need to consolidate domestic political
power).
381. See generally LEY 278-98 DEL 29 DEJULIO DE 1998, que modica los Articulos 4, 5,
8 y 17 y agrega los Articulos 35 y 36 (stipulating that all decisions concerning extradi-
tion are subject to discretion of President).
382. Dominican Treaty, supra note 36.
383. No. 489 LEY DE ExTRADiccI6N DEL 22 DE OcruRE DE 1969 (Dom. Rep.).
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tionals.3 84  These legislators needed modernized vehicles
through which to attack these alarming new criminal trends.3 85
Dominican lawmakers concomitantly understood that in order
to renovate their anti-crime mechanisms, they needed to rede-
fine their concept of sovereignty.3 86 The Dominican extradition
reform thus served these purposes by overhauling outdated and
outmoded criminal law mechanisms.
The content of the new law, however, also reflects more
practical and political motivations.3 87 When Fernandez assumed
the presidency in 1996, his political base was weak. Drug traf-
fickers and drug profits supported Fernandez's political oppo-
nents and influenced legislative policy.38 8 Fernandez therefore
used extradition as a tool to attack the drug dealers who sup-
ported his political rivals, thus enhancing his own political viabil-
ity.3s Not surprisingly, therefore, the new law provides enor-
mous discretion to the President over extradition decisions.3 9 0
C. The New Extradition Laws in Colombia and the Dominican
Republic Will Hinder Anti-Drug Law Enforcement
The motivations that predicated the new extradition laws in
Colombia and the Dominican Republic will ultimately inhibit
these laws' ability to produce greater anti-drug enforcement re-
sults. In Colombia, the law is toothless; to date, no Colombians
have been extradited under it.391 In the Dominican Republic,
the law potentially could produce enormous results because of
384. See supra notes 133-43 and accompanying text (stating that Dominican drug
dealers aid Colombian traffickers through transport of cocaine in Caribbean and in
distribution in U.S. cities).
385. See supra notes 295-99 and accompanying text (stating that Dominican
lawmakers recognized that extradition is necessary to combat drug trafficking).
386. See id. (stating that Dominican lawmakers understood that extradition is not
violation of sovereignty).
387. See supra notes 302-08 and accompanying text (stating that creation of extra-
dition reform in Dominican Republic had political motivations).
388. See id. (explaining that Fernandez used extradition as means to remove power
base of his political opponents).
389. Id.
390. See generally LEY 278-98 DEL 29 DEJULIO DE 1998, que modica los Articulos 4, 5,
8 y 17 y agrega los Articulos 35 y 36 (Dom. Rep.) (stipulating that all decisions concern-
ing extradition are subject to discretion of President).
391. See supra note 331 and accompanying text (reporting that no Colombians
have been extradited pursuant to the Colombian extradition law because of non-retro-
activity provision).
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Fernandez's wide discretion to permit extradition.392 Con-
versely, however, this discretion provides too much dependence
upon one man. Thus, Dominican extradition reform will always
remain subservient to Fernandez's political agenda. As a result,
the extradition reforms in both Colombia and the Dominican
Republic are not likely to be effective agents in the War on
Drugs.
CONCLUSION
Both Colombia and the Dominican Republic enacted extra-
dition laws for their own reasons, including-but not necessarily
focused upon-accommodating the U.S. anti-drug philosophy.
In Colombia, the form in which the legislature enacted the law
reflected, to some degree, the efforts of a motivated, modern
government seeking international legitimacy. To a much larger
extent, however, this law reveals the Colombian government's at-
tempt to execute its own anti-drug policies as it sees fit.
In the Dominican Republic, the structure of the extradition
reform demonstrates that Dominican political thought has ac-
cepted more modern definitions of sovereignty. The law also re-
flects President Fernandez's interest in removing drug money
from the political system, thus carrying out his election promises
and fostering internal party strength. Moreover, this reform
symbolizes Fernandez's endeavor to consolidate personal power
and authority over the Dominican polity.
Both nations realize the international scope and signifi-
cance of their domestic drug problems. Thus, for a variety of
overlapping considerations, both Colombia and the Dominican
Republic have focused upon extradition as the primary tool for
realizing their goals. In the end, however, the central considera-
tions motivating the new extradition policies will ultimately serve
to reduce the laws' significance in international drug enforce-
ment.
392. See generally LEv 278-98 DEL 29 DEJut1o DE 1998, que modica los Articulos 4, 5,
8 y 17 y agrega los Articulos 35 y 36 (providing President with unlimited authority to
grant or deny extradition requests).
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